Bin Laden's Ghost

by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright December 29, 2004
All Rights Reserved.

t was former CIA Director George J. Tenet who declared his toothless war on Osama bin Laden in 1998, following bombings of U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya. Former President Bill Clinton ordered the throwaway Crusie Missile attack at Al Qaeda training camps 200 kilometers southwest of Kabul. Since then, Bin Landen eluded the CIA, blew up in 2000 the guided missile frigate Cole in Yemen's Port of Aden killing 17 U.S. sailors and finally demolished the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon on Sept 11, 2001. All the best minds at the CIA, in concert with elite U.S. Special Forces and world's best intelligence agencies, couldn't kill or capture the global terrorist. Chasing him into the remote mountains of Tora Bora, the rocky region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, hasn't gotten any closer to the slippery Saudi renegade.

      Several CIA departments and hundreds of employees work round-the-clock at the analyzing data hoping to pinpoint the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden. Putting Bin Laden's video and audiotapes under the microscope, the CIA currently spins its wheels trying to detect the invisible Saudi terrorist. Using geologists and botanists haven't helped locate Bin Laden and his chief deputy's, Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zahwahiri, hiding place. Bands of CIA doctors and psychiatrists interpret every nuance of Bin Laden's appearance, mannerisms, voice and surroundings, gleaning clues about his physical and mental health. Even bird experts help determine the species-specific environment in which Bin Laden recorded his last audio and videotapes. Obsessing about every conceivable detail affords fulltime employment but doesn't get any closer to ending Bin Laden's command.

      Analyzing Bin Laden's attire or environment doesn't get U.S. forces one-step closer to his capture or killing. U.S. Special Forces hit a brick wall trying to figure out Bin Laden's whereabouts. “It's a good example of people putting too much emphasis on superficial aspects of the tape, when what Bin Laden says is typically more important than what he wears,” said Michael Scheuer, the CIA's former chief tracking Bin Laden. Creating a new bureaucracy to study Bin Laden doesn't help get complete the CIA's ultimate mission. Since Sept. 11, Bin Laden has made 18 audio and videotapes, including 12 others by his chief deputy Zahwahiri. Despite many public displays following the bombing of Tora Bora, the White House insisted it didn't know whether Bin Laden was dead or alive. Pretending he was gone scored PR points war but didn't help end his reign of terror.

      Bin Laden's recent message praises Jordanian-born terrorist Abu Musab Zarqawi for leading the insurgency in Iraq. Zarqawi apparently joined forces with Al Qaeda, supplying what seems like unending suicide bombers to resist U.S. occupation. “Anyone who takes part in this election consciously and willingly is an infidel,” said Bin Laden, warning Iraqis that bloodshed will accompany January elections. But whatever message Bin Laden chooses to telegraph, his audio and videotapes hold significant propaganda value, informing Arab viewers that Al Qaeda is alive and well. No matter how many CIA analysts authenticate the tapes, or, for that matter, speculate about Bin Laden's whereabouts, it doesn't penetrate Al Qaeda or get the CIA within striking distance. Without resources on the ground, all the geniuses at Langley won't get one inch closer to finishing the job.

      Bin Laden's public remarks energize terrorists either recruiting suicide bombers or planning new missions. Seeing his image or hearing his voice energizes his followers to lash out. Whether Bin Laden's tapes have coded messages to terrorists is anyone's guess. His presence on the airwaves hurts U.S. propaganda that Bin Laden is no longer a force on the ground. Like he did in Afghanistan under Soviet occupation, Bin Laden is successfully recruiting his mujahedeen from the Islamic world. Without knowing it, the U.S. gave Bin Laden the best recruiting tool. Nothing galvanizes his followers more than U.S. occupation in Iraq. Appearing on the airwaves helps Bin Laden by reminding his followers that the insurgency works. No longer able to dispute his existence, the insurgency has picked up steam. If there's a chance of breaking the insurgency, the U.S. must get Bin Laden.

      Analyzing minutiae at CIA headquarters isn't enough to kill or capture Osama bin Laden. It's going to take sustained infiltration on the ground to finally get a good reading on his whereabouts. Spy agencies must do a better job of putting boots on the ground. There's no substitute for good old-fashioned spying and espionage. Sitting on computers at headquarters won't help infiltrate Bin Laden's terror organization. Bin Laden's audio and videotapes serve the purpose largely of inspiring his followers. “The central challenge of penetrating [Al Qaeda] remains true today as it did before Sept. 11,” said Roger W. Cresey, a former counter-terrorism official in the Clinton and Bush administrations, criticizing the CIA for spending too much time analyzing and too little time spying. If the U.S. hopes to break the insurgency and make any progress in Iraq, Bin Laden must be stopped.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.


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