by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright December 17, 2001
All Rights Reserved.

fter years of violence and armed struggle, it's difficult for Arafat to suddenly change his stripes. Declared "irrelevant" by Israel last week, Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat launched his own PR blitzkrieg, salvaging the wreckage from the latest suicide bombings—leaving his authority in shambles. Taking to the airwaves, Arafat delivered a rare TV address, pleading with Palestinians—and radical groups—to refrain from suicide missions and other violence. Even Israel's dovish Foreign Minister Shimon Peres remained skeptical, reminding comrades that Arafat "cannot be judged by words and speeches. We have to try to follow the coming few days—to see what's being done, not just what's being said." While Arafat's entreaty scored some points, it doesn't deal with the fundamental problem for Israelis: Arafat can't be trusted. Time and again, he cleverly played the propaganda game, manipulating public opinion. Justifying his recent revolt, Arafat blamed Sharon for visiting Temple Mount and trashing Al Aqsa mosque. Unfortunately for Arafat, the rules of the game changed on Sept. 11: Terrorism was no longer a legitimate way to achieve Palestinian statehood.

      While Arafat's crackdown seems sincere, most Israelis dismiss his lip service as a clever publicity stunt. Placing quadriplegic Sheikh Ahmed Yassin under "house arrest" and detaining militants doesn't change the situation on the ground. For the past 15 months, Arafat engaged in armed struggle against Israeli occupation, nodding and winking while Hamas and Islamic Jihad recruited suicide bombers and launched kamikaze attacks. Inciting Palestinians into believing they're fighting a real war of liberation, Arafat encouraged violence as a way of exacting political concessions. His rejection of Barak's last peace accord raises irreconcilable flaws in Palestinian thinking. Calling Israel an "occupying force," Arafat makes little distinction between Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel's 1948 borders. Most people automatically assume that "occupied territories" refer to Israel's post-1967 spoils of war. But to many Palestinians, Israel's pre-1967 borders are the real "occupied territory," essentially rejecting UN Resolution 242, recognizing Israel's right to exist.

      Arafat played good-cop, bad-cop, separating himself from the militant groups claiming responsibility for deadly suicide bombings and other terrorist acts. When Black September ambushed the Israeli Olympic team at the 1972 Munich Olympics, Arafat looked the other way, claiming radical groups had the right to protest Israeli occupation. Hassan Yusef, spokesman for the radical group Hamas in Ramallah, asked "to whom Arafat was speaking" when he called for an end to attacks on Israelis. "Because we the Palestinian people, who are exposed to the atrocities of Israeli aggression, have a right to defend ourselves," said Yusef, excusing civilian carnage to achieve political objectives. Only after world opinion—and the White House—turned against Arafat did his political handlers insist that he repair the damage. While Arafat's now back-pedaling, he still echoes Yusef's sentiments that Palestinians have the right to resist. After supporting violence and suicide bombings since 1948, Arafat admitted that the events of Sept. 11 changed the nature of his struggle. Terrorism—for whatever cause—was no longer acceptable.

      Arafat's big problem now involves his abrupt change of direction. After supporting violent resistance for so long, it's difficult, in one speech, to suddenly reverse gears. Despite Arafat's words, Israeli authorities doubt whether he can change his stripes. "He needs to convince the one constituency that he lost in the past 14 months, the Israeli public," said Sharon spokesman Raanan Gissin, expressing doubts that Arafat can pull off a sudden about face. In reality, his political survival accounts for his sudden flip-flop—not a sudden change of heart. Hamas abruptly dismissed Arafat's conciliatory gestures. "The intifada came because of the failure of the dialogue that was held for 10 barren years with the Israelis," said Yusef, forgetting Barak's unprecedented offer in August 2000, giving Palestinians the West Bank, Gaza, and parts of East Jerusalem. Radical groups like Hamas couldn't accept any deal in which Palestinians weren't given the right of return to pre-1948 borders—in other words, a deal breaker. Conciliatory speeches and fancy public relations can't undo the damage from years of violence and armed struggle.

      Bin Laden's phony Islamic revolution serves as misguided inspiration to radical Palestinians. Bin Laden cleverly seduces radical groups to take up "jihad" in the name of Islam, when, in fact, it's pandering to his self-serving terror campaign. While exploiting Islam works for Bin Laden, it boomerangs for Arafat, whose followers are more interested in jobs than revolution. Radicalization has been brought about more by false promises and failed expectations than pie-in-the-sky fantasies about Islam. Arafat's jailhouse conversion from armed militant back to diplomat is clearly connected with his political undoing. "This brings us back of square one," says Abdul Jawad Saleh, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, frustrated with Arafat's leadership and believing that it "ignores Palestinian interests." Also weakening Arafat's authority was the U.S. veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for international monitors. Issuing the veto gave Israel the green light to take security into its own hands.

      Arafat caused his own downfall by abrogating the 1993 Oslo Accords, opting instead for violence to achieve Palestinian statehood. When he began his new intifada in September 2000, he unilaterally reversed the economic and political gains earned from strategic cooperation. Blaming Sharon's visit to Temple Mount on the current revolt, Arafat diverted attention away from corruption and undeniable failures. Running out of cash, he had no alternative other than whipping up anti-Israeli sentiment and sponsoring violence. While he'd like to distance himself from the radical groups threatening his authority, he can't instantly change directions. After turning militants loose from prison, he invited the suicide bombing and anarchy now toppling his authority. Whether Arafat sponsors terrorism today or can't control radical groups, it still reflects abysmal leadership. "But even more fundamentally and troubling," said Sec. of State Colin A. Powell, "they [Hamas and Islamic Jihad] attacked his authority to lead the Palestinian people toward a cease-fire and a process of peace." For Arafat, there's no turning back—time has already run out.

About the Author

John M. Curtis is editor of OnlineColumnist.com and columnist for the Los Angeles Daily Journal. He directs a Los Angeles think tank specializing in political consulting and strategic communication. He's author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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