by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright December 15, 2002
All Rights Reserved.

trapped for cash, North Korea, the impoverished vestige of Asian Marxism, pulled a fast one on the international community, smuggling Scud missiles into Yemen. Intercepted by Spanish and U.S. authorities near the Gulf of Aden—the same place where Al Qaeda blew a 40-foot hole in the guided missile frigate U.S.S. Cole, killing 17 sailors in 2000—a disguised North Korean ship delivered its illicit payload to the terrorist-infested North African nation. Camouflaged with bags of concrete, authorities uncovered Scud missiles, intended, no doubt, for someone other than the Yemeni military. "Today's action has been a real blow to U.S. credibility and U.S. nonproliferation policy," said Jon B. Wolfthal, a nonproliferation expert with Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, disappointed that the U.S. had no "legal" authority to confiscate the cargo. True to form, the North Koreans—and their reclusive leader Kim Jong Il—were up to no good.

      North Korean Scud missiles, though inaccurate, have a range of 300 nautical miles, making them illegal under current nonproliferation treaties. The Missile Technology Control Regime bans the sale and distribution of missiles with a range over 185 miles. Yet, after securing a commitment from Yemeni President Al Adullah Saleh to no longer buy missiles from North Korea, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin A. Powell released the freight. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld ordered the Korean freighter tracked, after suspicions that it was headed to Iraq. "The cargo belongs to the Yemini government and its armed forces for defense purposes, and it will not reach a third party," said Yemini Foreign Minister Abubakr al Qerbi, reassuring U.S. authorities that the missiles wouldn't fall into enemy hands. That was the same government insisting Bin Laden had nothing to do with the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.

      No war on terrorism can be effective unless the U.S. has the right to interdict potential weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein packed botulinum toxin into the warheads of Scud missiles in 1991. It's folly to think that North Korea's Scud missiles won't fall into evil hands. With U.N. inspectors busy scouring Iraq, it's been rumored that Saddam already relocated his deadliest weapons and materiel to unnamed North African nations, possibly Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya or even the West Bank and Gaza. "We have no idea whether these missiles were really intended for the Yemini military or whether they would end up in the wrong hands," said Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), criticizing the White House for spending too much time on Iraq. Critics contend that North Korea and Iran—two legs of Bush's "Axis of Evil"—represent more pressing treats than Iraq.

      Throwing the administration for a loop, North Korea announced that it would abrogate a 1994 agreement with the Clinton Administration to halt dual-use nuclear facilities, citing pressing energy needs. Allowing North Korea to deliver Scud missiles to Yemen sets a dangerous precedent in the war on terrorism. If North Korea sells conventional Scuds, they'll peddle nuclear warheads if available. Unlike Iraq, North Korea commands a prolific arms industry, which, like the old Soviet Union, bleeds their economy into insolvency. Though one-fourth the size of Iraq, North Korea spends nearly five fold on its military, commanding 1.2 million troops, 1,700 aircraft and 12,000 artillery systems. But unlike Saddam, Kim Jong Il hasn't gassed his own people or invaded his neighbors, despite developing deadly weapons' programs. With China, Japan and 37,000 U.S. troops on its border, North Korea is held in check.

      When the Shah fell to the Ayatollah Khomeni in 1979, the U.S. lost a strategic ally in the Persian Gulf. Since then, the U.S. has relied heavily on Israel for intelligence and strategic operations, despite having bases in Saudi Arabia and the surrounding Emirates. Critics contend that the U.S. gave too much support to Saddam Hussein during the 10-year Iran-Iraq war, keeping the Iranians contained. For geopolitical reasons, supporting Hussein made sense at the time. So did financing Bin Laden and the Moujahedeen during the Soviet's occupation of Afghanistan—so much for history. Today's dynamics change from day to day, requiring unending flexibility in managing emerging dangers. Putting Iraq in the crosshairs doesn't erase growing threats in other parts of the world, including North Korea and Iran. All countries must economize, set priorities and pick the right battles.

      Asymmetric wars, by definition, require ongoing shifts in political, economic and military strategy corresponding to emerging threats from enemies' plans and ambitions. Calling the State Department "confused" or hypocritical because Bin Laden's still on the loose or because countries like North Korea and Iran present growing threats, doesn't undo geopolitical challenges in the Persian Gulf. Iraq commands higher priority precisely because the U.S. needs a better foothold in the Persian Gulf to neutralize emerging dangers. Bush's "regime change" policy in Iraq recognizes Saddam Hussein as a dangerous menace, hell bent on developing weapons of mass destruction and retaliating against U.S. targets. "As I said from the beginning of this new war in the 21st century . . . each threat requires a different kind of response," said president Bush, counseling patience and reminding critics that the war on terrorism is a work in progress.

About The Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's a consultant and expert in strategic communication. He's author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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