by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright November 28, 2004
All Rights Reserved.

ushing for elections on Jan. 30, interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi hopes to consolidate power, ushering in a new era of Shiite rule. Lurking in the background are not only insurgents but Iraq's ethnic minorities unwilling to consign authority to a Shiite majority with ties to Tehran. Early elections slam the door on the current power grab where Sunnis and Kurds get aced out. Shiites argue that postponing the elections would strengthen the hand of terrorists busy undermining U.S. occupation. “Under the law it cannot be postponed and the government is working on the premise that the elections will be held on time,” Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh told the British Broadcasting Corp. A growing number of ethnic factions—including Kurds and Sunnis—oppose rushing elections, concerned that a U.S.-backed Shiite government could lead to civil war.

      Visiting war-ravaged Fallujah, U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte lent his support to early elections. Opponents to early elections cite security concerns, though it's clear that the real issue involves allowing the U.S. to pick Saddam's successor—a prelude to civil war. “National elections will be taking place on 30 of January next year, an we want to do everything possible to create the conditions so that everyone who is eligible to vote in this country will be able to do so,” said Negroponte, ignoring the growing likelihood that a U.S.-picked government would lead to disaster. Since landing April 2003 in Shiite-controlled oil port of Umm al Qassr, the U.S. hoped to cause a Shiite revolt. When U.S. troops were met with Kalashnikovs and rocket-propelled grenades, it dispelled the myth that Shiites supported the U.S. mission. It's clear that Shiite exiles have the closest ties to the White House.

      Like in Afghanistan, holding early elections serves the dual purpose of (a) creating a legal sovereign entity and (b) picking leaders friendly to the White House. U.S. authorities hope to avoid the same mess in Iraq that exists in Afghanistan where the legal authority controls only small portions of the capital city and nowhere else. Installing Allawi in Baghdad risks the same scenario, where Kurds and Sunnis split off the rest of the country. Sunnis already threaten to boycott upcoming elections. “In conditions of this kind of violence, these elections are going to be deeply flawed,” said Tariq Hashemi, spokesman for Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni political group. Hashemi mirrors the same concerns of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan calling for delays because Allawi currently lacks the grassroots support needed for legitimacy.

      Like Saddam's Sunni power base, Kurds also have deep suspicions over Shiite rule, especially with Grand Ayatollahs Mohammed Said Hakim and Ali Sistani supporting early elections. When Saddam set down a revolt in 1987 with poisoned gas, the Kurds developed deep distrust. Since then, they've been promised an independent Kurdish state, together with the oil riches of Kirkuk. So far, the plight of the Kurds have been ignored again, with Allawi's government planning to control oil-rich Kirkuk. When both Kurdish political parties balked at early elections, it signaled Kurds' opposition to Allawi's plans. Under Allawi's Iraq Kurds won't fair any better than under Saddam, though they probably won't be gassed. Despite antagonizing Turkey, an independent Kurdistan gives the U.S. another strategic ally—and base—to contain a growing Iranian threat.

      Before the U.S. goes off half-cocked, it must reconsider and reconfigure the geopolitics of a new Iraq. Handing power to Allawi invites civil war by antagonizing Kurds and Sunnis, especially within the still unstable Sunni triangle. Allowing a new Iraq to stifle an independent Kurdistan promotes more instability. U.S. diplomats must bring Ankara into the fold, accepting the inevitability of an independent Kurdish state. Kurds will not accept a new Iraq unless they enter into binding separatist talks, finally redeeming promises made to Kurdish leaders. With Iraq's strong Shiite majority, it's unfair to allow mob rule to short circuit Iraq's multiethnic government. Shiite rule lends legitimacy to the current insurgency seeking nothing short of anarchy and civil war. Iraq's Shiite majority has more ethnic and religious ties to Iran than its own multiethnic populations.

      Imposing early elections (a) consolidates Allawi's power and (b) gives the U.S. an eventual exit strategy. Despite pushing insurgents out of Fallujah, Iraq's new government faces a growing insurgency seeking to end U.S. occupation. Mounting casualties and unending terrorism puts pressure on the U.S. to find a legitimate way out. Iraq's warring factions won't accept a government handpicked by the White House. Rushing into elections may create sovereignty but won't deal with the long-range problem of reconciling Iraq's ethnic factions. Everyone knows that early elections hand power to Shiites, alienating both Sunnis and Kurds. Ignoring the Kurdish separatist movement puts Allawi into the same dilemma as Saddam: Either attack the Kurds or cede Iraq's second largest cash cow. Either way you cut it, Allawi faces the ugly prospects of civil war.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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