by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright November 20, 2001
All Rights Reserved.

lready reeling from abysmal losses, American Airlines looks to reassure nervous flyers and return to business as usual. Plummeting into the quaint Belle Harbor neighborhood of Queens on Nov. 12, American Airlines A300 Airbus apparently disintegrated in midair, shedding its wing, tail and jet engines, killing all 260 on board and 5 others on the ground. Only 8 weeks since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, tragedy hit New York again, leaving some wondering whether terrorists struck a second time. With Americans already afraid of flying, more terrorism would have added insult to injury, considering growing concerns about airport security. But despite suspicions, investigators found no evidence bomb residue, convincing proof that the plane was not brought down by a missile or bomb. Since 9/11, the airlines have done their utmost to reassure nervous travelers. Without clear answers, bargain flights alone won't draw fearful passengers back into the sky anytime soon.

      Since going down, Flight 587 opened a Pandora's box of unanswered questions, especially about the likely causes of the recent disaster. "It looks like there was a breakup of the aircraft," said former chairman of the National Transportation and Safety Board Jim Hall, scratching his head but leaning heavily away from terrorism and toward structural failure. "The sequence we are seeing in the crash I think is unprecedented," said airline safety expert Barry Schiff, also baffled by French-made airplane's unexpected collapse. Already spooked by terrorists, American's now worry about elementary airplane safety. Placing the National Guard at regional airports won't fix basic design flaws now suspected of causing the deadly crash on Queen's Rockaway Peninsula. Though the NTSB can't be certain yet of what precisely caused the crash, they're sure it wasn't terrorism or foul play. From the get-go, American Airlines was quick to blame the plane's breakup on unwanted flight turbulence. Like Firestone Rubber, they focused attention on extraneous factors, creating plausible deniability for future litigation.

      Fishing the wing and tail section out of Jamaica Bay, the NTSB knew from day-one that terrorists weren't involved. Without evidence of nitrates, fingers pointed toward extreme mechanical failure. "I don't know of another crash where you lose the tail section so cleanly and the vertical wing and a hunk of the wing comes off," said Schiff, puzzled by the magnitude of the A300's downfall. In the wake of 9/11, it's easy to blame terrorists for almost anything—including Anthrax—but facts speak for themselves. "All information we have currently is that this is an accident," said NTSB Chairman Marion C. Blakely, trying to reassure frazzled travelers, but characterizing the doomed jetliner as an accident. Calling doomed Flight 587 an accident seems a bit strange, considering that both black boxes identified a pronounced "airframe rattling noise" only 1 minute, 47 seconds after takeoff—and didn't point toward pilot error. No, all findings so far indicated inexplicable structural disintegration. Like an old jalopy, the plane simply fell apart. Asked whether wake turbulence could have torn off the wing and vertical stabilizer, NTSB member George Black reluctantly admitted "that's possible."

      Inspecting the wreckage, NTSB officials reported that the rear stabilizer or rudder broke off above the bolted attachment to the fuselage, shooting down the theory that sabotage caused the mishap. Honing in on the cause, the NTSB is now carefully examining composite material of Flight 587's tailfin. Used by Airbus since 1986, resin and carbon fiber composites lightened the aircraft, adding better fuel economy. But, unlike aluminum, composites are only 15 years old, lacking a long maintenance record. In 1998, the Federal Aviation Administration issued two airworthiness directives concerning composite materials. Visual inspections for "fatigue related cracking, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage, wing and vertical stabilizer," offered a chilling premonition of what likely doomed Flight 587. Though the directive called for visual inspections, it's clear that surface cracks alone aren't always the best evidence of internal structural weakness. Like clogged arteries, the FAA must develop more reliable ways of diagnosing potentially fatal conditions in the fleet of aging airliners. "There are not a lot of visual indications that you can get," said Ronald Bucinell, a professor of mechanical engineering at Union College in Schenectady, N.Y., suggesting that external inspections aren't enough.

      But the most compelling evidence now comes from American Airline's press releases. Without further ado, American Airlines announced Nov. 19 that it completed visual inspections on all its 34 A300 Airbus passenger jets, despite warnings by engineers that visual inspections alone can't detect dangerous internal cracks. American Airlines didn't confirm whether they inspected their fleet with ultrasound equipment. Since 9/11, airlines have been scrambling to avoid bankruptcy, doing their utmost to get travelers back in the air. Even Congress' unprecedented $15 billion airline bailout won't last without returning to the busy schedules before 9/11. Landmark airport security legislation also won't coax passengers back into the air, if travelers worry about basic airplane safety. New security measures discourage travelers by creating more delays and inconvenience. Confiscating toenail clippers has nothing to do with making air travel safer. Federalizing 28,000 baggage screeners also won't undo travelers' fears if airlines can't guarantee safety of their own equipment.

       Publicity stunts aren't enough to get nervous travelers flying again—nor is well-intentioned legislation designed to beef up airport security. Airlines must commit to using sophisticated technology—including ultrasound and thermal imaging—to diagnose aging airliners with the same scientific rigor applied to human beings. Visual inspections aren't enough for humans, why should they be for deteriorating jetliners? As long as manufacturers use space-age composites, they must develop more sophisticated ways of inspecting aging equipment. Holding airlines accountable doesn't tell the whole story behind tragic equipment failures. Manufacturers like Airbus and Boeing must also do a better job of giving airlines the appropriate technology and recommendations to inspect vulnerable parts. Without the right diagnostic equipment, even federal agencies like the FAA and NTSB can't prevent mishaps in the making. Federal agencies, airlines, and, yes, manufacturers must stop pointing fingers and do a better job of sharing information to better protect airline passengers. Anything less, won't get it done.

About the Author

John M. Curtis is editor of OnlineColumnist.com and columnist for the Los Angeles Daily Journal. He's director of a Los Angeles think tank specializing in political consulting and strategic public relations. He's author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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