by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright November 9, 2004
All Rights Reserved.

ealizing that the war in Iraq will not only be won in the streets, Secretary of State Donald H. Rumsfeld launched his own propaganda offensive hoping to convert skeptics in Iraq and elsewhere. Marching on Fallouja sends a loud message to doubters questioning U.S. resolve to root out insurgents. Election year politics stalled the Pentagon's efforts to capture key battlegrounds, including Sunni-controlled strongholds of Fallouja and Ramadi. Shortly after Sen. John F. Kerry conceded, U.S. forces were given the green light to retake insurgent-infested Fallouja, the presumed base of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, though U.S. officials now believe the Jordanian-born terrorist has long-since moved on. But whether al-Zarqawi is killed or captured, U.S. control of Fallouja sends a loud message to insurgents hoping to derail plans for holding free elections in January.

      Taking Fallouja has huge symbolic value to skeptics believing that insurgents had the upper hand. Watching terrorists scatter gives Iraqi Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi renewed credibility that his U.S.-backed government is here to stay. Playing cat-and-mouse with insurgents sent the wrong signal that Iraq was losing its war with terrorists. “Success in Fallouja will deal a blow to terrorists in the country, and should move Iraq further away from a future of violence to one of freedom and opportunity for the Iraqi people,” said Rumsfeld at a Pentagon briefing. Rumsfeld reassured not only Iraqis but also growing skepticism inside the U.S. Winning reelection gives the White House some breathing room for delivering President George W. Bush's promise of democracy. Gaining the upper hand in Fallouja gives new life to administration plans for scheduled elections.

      Since Baghdad fell in April 9, 2003, the U.S. has been locked in tit-for-tat battle with insurgents, with little measurable progress. Iraqis have grown increasingly skeptical of U.S. efforts to reinforce Allawi's new government. With U.S. troops routing insurgents in Fallouja, Iraq's interim government gains a distinct propaganda advantage. Without putting up resistance, terrorists, like in Afghanistan, find themselves on the run, forced to hide in remote locations. Driving terrorists out of symbolic strongholds like Fallouja and Ramadi tells the Iraqi public Allawi's new Iraqi government is beginning to take charge. Dislodging terrorists from recognized strongholds doesn't solve the dilemma of preventing jihadists from streaming across Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Bilateral agreements and special efforts must be made to seal off Iraq's porous borders.

      Credit Iraq's interim leader Allawi with recognizing that there can be no compromise with terrorists. Like Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Allawi finds himself one bullet away from anarchy. He knows that his only hope of survival is to use U.S. forces to push insurgents further from Baghdad, while, simultaneously, building up his own military. So far, Allawi's new military and security forces have proved disappointing, especially the recent massacre of 50 Iraqi troops suggesting infiltration. It's hard to know whether rank-and-file Iraqis support Allawi's new government or insurgents fighting to expel U.S. occupation. As Rumsfeld knows, any long-range strategy must include winning the heart-and-minds of Iraqi civilians. Only through an all-out media blitz can the U.S. hope to turn Iraqis against terrorists currently supported by Al Jazerra and Al Arabiya TV.

      Driving tanks into the heart of Fallouja deals a blow to insurgents telling the Iraqi people that they're winning the battle against U.S. occupation. Iraqis won't support U.S. efforts until they believe insurgents are losing power. No one wants to see Fallouja go the way of Samarra, where U.S. forces liberated the city but now falls prey to ongoing terrorist attacks. Putting off the assault on Fallouja in April only made matters worse. Terrorists were permitted to amass and dig in, causing bigger headaches for U.S. forces retaking key cities inside the Sunni Triangle. “It's like pulling your fist out of a bucket of water, and everyone seeps back in,” said Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, concerned that Fallouja won't be Rumsfeld's “tipping point.” If Fallouja joins Samarra, it won't reassure too many Iraqis that the insurgency is under control.

      Rumsfeld put his finger on the pulse realizing that the U.S. must do a better job of winning the hearts-and-minds of ordinary Iraqis. Rooting out insurgents and retaking Iraqi strongholds won't work unless the U.S. confronts insurgents' formidable propaganda machine, supported in large part by Al Jazerra and Al Arabiya TV and radio. Iraqis must be convinced that there's no going back. They must repeatedly hear that insurgents are losing ground to Iraq's new government. Despite skeptics, Allawi must keep up the war-of-words against pernicious propaganda. “It may not take long to capture the city, but nothing will have been resolved. It will be a symbolic victory,” said French military strategist Jean Louis Dufour, proving, if nothing else, that propaganda doesn't only stem from the Middle East. Iraq must follow Rumsfeld's lead and confront the profits of doom-and-gloom.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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