by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright October 28, 2003
All Rights Reserved.

efending his Iraq policy, President George W. Bush took the offensive defining the war as the “central front in the war on terrorism.” Hit with a barrage of criticism, Bush took the slippery slope of redefining the mission, no longer consumed by weapons of mass destruction—insisting that the war on terrorism was like no other war. Faced with mounting casualties and growing terrorism, Bush told the press he would not be cowed. “We are constantly looking at the enemy and adjusting,” said Bush, after one of the bloodiest days since the end of formal combat operations on May 1. On the first day of Ramadan, suicide bombers hit five different locations, killing scores of Iraqis, designed to (a) intimidate Iraq's fledgling police forces and government and (b) discourage the U.S. mission. Two days earlier, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz took rocket fire at Baghdad's Al Rashid hotel.

      Two years before hitting Baghdad with Cruise Missiles on March 20, the White House pressed its relentless case against Saddam Hussein. Multiple sources of domestic and foreign intelligence indicated that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, posing a “gathering” threat to U.S. national security. Both the CIA and German intelligence estimated that Saddam was only a few years away from a workable atomic device. In the wake of Sept. 11, few members of Congress could ignore that risk, voting almost unanimously to give Bush a resolution to use force. Richard Butler and his team of U.N. weapons inspector disputed White House claims that Saddam posed an imminent threat. Since ending formal combat May 1, Bush struggled to redefine the mission, placing too much emphasis on democratizing Iraq. From the get-go, the administration overemphasized weapons of mass destruction.

      Before going to war, the White House tried to play up the connection between 9/11 and Saddam Hussein. Only recently has Bush admitted he's not aware of any link between Osama bin Laden and Iraq's Baathist regime. Yet since Sept. 11, much ado was made about an unconfirmed meeting between Mohammed Atta [the alleged Sept. 11 ringleader] and an Iraqi security agent in Prague, drawing the specious connection between Baghdad and Bin Laden. Before the war, Bush mentioned little about democratizing Iraq, leaving his critics to rail about his postwar strategy. In reality, there were plenty of legitimate reasons to topple Saddam. Getting rid of Hussein and establishing a friendly regime gives the U.S. a strategic foothold in the volatile Persian Gulf. Trading with a new Iraq would help break OPEC's stranglehold on Middle Eastern oil and give the U.S. a strategic partner.

      When the Ayatollah Khomeini ejected the Shah of Iran and hijacked the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979, radical Islam gradually replaced the Soviet Union as biggest threat to U.S. national security. Before the Berlin Wall fell Nov. 9, 1989, the CIA committed itself to weakening the Soviet Union by supporting Afghan rebels known as the mujahedeen. Little did anyone know that its leader Osama Bin Laden would become the U.S.'s most lethal enemy since Adolf Hitler. Covertly funding Bin Laden dramatically strengthened radical Islam and contributed to his relentless terror campaign, since trying to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993. During the same time, the CIA armed and subsidized Saddam hoping to contain Khomeini. While U.S. support kept Khomeini out of Baghdad, it turned Saddam into an implacable enemy, eventually invading Kuwait in Jan. 1991.

      Coming full circle, Bush now deals with the expected fallout from toppling Saddam—something President H.W. Bush, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin A. Powell strongly opposed in 1991. In the first Gulf War, marching to Baghdad carried inherent risks, including inducing a power vacuum and leaving Iraq in chaos. Since toppling Hussein April 14, the expected anarchy occurred, opening the floodgates to practically every Islamic terrorist on the planet. Calling Iraq the “central front in the war on terrorism” rings true today, but only after ending Saddam's rule. Before Baghdad fell, Saddam kept an iron grip on both Sunni and Shiite radicals, seeking, like the Ayatollah Khomeini, to turn Iraq into the next Islamic state. With terrorists infiltrating Iraq, Bush pledged to beef up security and redouble efforts to seal off Iraq's porous borders.

      Dealing with spiraling terrorism, the U.S. faces the daunting task of rebuilding Iraq. Unlike the Marshall plan after World War II, the U.S. can't afford to throw billions of tax dollars down a rat hole, watching rebuilding efforts torpedoed by radicals opposed to Iraq's reconstruction. As long as Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia allow Islamic terrorists to cross into Iraq, the Pentagon will face mounting casualties. Securing Iraq's borders is a necessary first step but won't automatically purge Iraq of Saddam loyalists and foreign terrorists currently hampering the reconstruction. Building more checkpoints and barriers won't change the hearts-and-minds of radicals believing it's their Islamic duty to resist U.S. occupation. No amount of U.S. forces can stop a determined enemy, until the Iraqi people decide to take security into their own hands. Only then can they join U.S. efforts to help create a free Iraq.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging the Bullet and Operation Charisma. `

©1999-2002 Discobolos Consulting Services, Inc.
(310) 204-8300
All Rights Reserved.