by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright October 26, 2001
All Rights Reserved.

.S. can’t count on Afghanistan’s disjointed tribes to prosecute its war against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. When the Taliban assassinated charismatic Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Masoud just days before Bin Laden’s Sept. 11 attack, the loosely knit group of Afghan warlords unraveled. Even before Masoud’s demise, the Northern Alliance, with its tattered equipment and tired personnel, were driven into Afghanistan’s remote northern province, confined to around 5% of the country. They posed no real threat to the Taliban. Announcing military action against Bin Laden, President Bush resuscitated an otherwise moribund cause, hoping to make headway against the Taliban’s superior strength. “What we are saying is deploy [U.S] Special Forces in coordination with our forces on the ground, make fast moves, secure certain spots and then expand our territory,” said smooth-talking 32-year-old Northern Alliance envoy Harom Amin, asking the U.S. for a mere $50 million per month. While the Pentagon would like all the help it can get, it shouldn’t lean too heavily on Afghanistan’s tribal warfare.

       Softening up Taliban positions north of Kabul or near Mazar-i-Sharif with relentless bombing is also no guarantee of success. With all the firepower, the Northern Alliance still complains about Taliban superiority. Promising to take the strategic outpost of Mazar-i-Sharif, the Alliance has no shortage of excuses. “Our war in Mazar-i-Sharif wasn’t a real war. It was a mistake,” said Northern Alliance interior minister Mohammed Yunis Kanuni, admitting that his forces weren’t in sync. “Why? They weren’t serious about this. All of the moujahedeen thought the Taliban would be finished by the [U.S. led] bombing,” suggesting that warlords wouldn’t press ahead without the U.S. wiping the Taliban off the map. Taking Mazar, with its easy access to Uzbekistan and two military airfields, would be a prime asset to U.S. operations. “Our forces are not ready in one week to capture Mazar-i-Sharif,” said Mohammed Hashad Saad, the Alliance’s ambassador to Uzbekistan. “In one month there will be a change, maybe.” Putting up token resistance since 1996, it’s clear that the Alliance lacks the resources—and will—to finish the job.

       Before the U.S. began bombing on Oct. 7, the Alliance lost so much ground that they were hemmed-in to the remote Panjshir valley. Despite Alliance claims that it controls 35% of the country, the Taliban easily beat back feeble advances, leaving the loosely configured Tajik and Uzbek tribes with little chance of gaining ground. Beyond being poorly equipped, the Alliance couldn’t coordinate its disparate warlords to launch an effective assault. Even hardboiled generals—once bitter rivals—like Abdul Rashid Dostum and Mohammed Ata don’t seem too eager to take unnecessary risks. Despite smooth-talking diplomats, key commanders aren’t willing to sacrifice creature comforts to fight America’s battles. While Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld would like to see the Alliance pull their weight, they have too many excuses. Before U.S. involvement, the Alliance was content to fire long range mortars—not hand-to-hand combat. Routed by the Taliban, few Alliance warriors have the nerve to challenge Mohammed Omar’s forces without dramatic reinforcements.

       Reversing fortunes—and loyalties—are all too common in Afghanistan’s tribal warfare. Reports about the Taliban’s defections are hyped, largely for propaganda purposes. On the ground, the Taliban still command an intimidating psychological advantage, beating back every advance since seizing power 1996. Like the New York Yankees, few teams have the confidence to prevail. “The United States is coordinating its air assault with the Northern Alliance and is attacking the right targets,” said Alliance ambassador to Uzbekistan Mohammed Hashad Saad, making excuses why his alliance hasn’t yet captured Mazar-i-Sharif. Blaming inadequate U.S. bombing sounds like a familiar excuse given by South Vietnam. And that’s precisely why the U.S. can’t fight the Alliance’s battles. Nor can the U.S. expect the Alliance to fight its battles. “All the mujahedeen thought: ‘The Taliban are finished. We will go all the way to Mazar-i-Sharif,’ but they were too optimistic by far,” said Kanuni, offering more excuses and expecting the U.S. to do the heavy lifting.

       Warlords like Dostum and Ata fight at their own pace. Warring tribes go on hiatus for inclement weather, religious holidays or any other reason. U.S. can’t count on the eccentricities of tribal warfare. It must clearly define and complete military objectives without interruption. Counting too much on warlords or even well-meaning diplomats, whose ambitions may not coincide with U.S. plans, detours the U.S. from its primary mission of neutralizing Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Supplying the Alliance arms is one thing, but trying to coordinate military operations seduces the U.S. into an unending conflict. Unlike the Alliance, Taliban fighters have Bin Laden’s iron grip enforcing loyalty and discipline. So far, Bin Laden’s superior training and deep pockets have paid off. But his real edge involves the use of Islamic fanatics whose willingness to die for the cause gives added fierceness and determination. Also adding to the Taliban’s toughness is the fact that they’re largely Pushtuns—Afghanistan’s predominant tribe.

       Fighting terrorism, the U.S. shouldn’t get bogged down in Afghanistan’s tribal warfare. Ethnic strife and renegade warlords make military coordination an uphill battle. Despite the fast talk, it’s clear that the so-called Northern Alliance lacks more than just firepower to displace the Taliban. Without popular support, it’s unlikely that loosely knit tribes can compete with the Taliban’s single-minded focus. “We don’t have any political problems with America about the future, but there is some political problems between America and Pakistan,” said Kanuni, already accusing the U.S. and Pakistan of undercutting the Alliance’s military plans. In reality, the Alliance doesn’t have the popular support—or political will—to beat the Taliban and govern Afghanistan. Despite their brutality, the Taliban mirrors the despair of war-torn Afghans looking to be rescued by the illusion of radical Islam. While it’s tempting to be sucked into regional conflicts, the U.S. must retain its focus on dismantling terrorism—not curing Afghanistan’s age-old problems.

About the Author

John M. Curtis is editor of OnlineColumnist.com and columnist for the Los Angeles Daily Journal. He’s director of a Los Angeles think tank specializing in political consulting and strategic public relations. He’s the author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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