Iran's Concession

by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright Oct. 21, 2009
All Rights Reserved.

              Faced with mounting pressure by the U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany and, to a lesser extent, China and Russia, Iran reluctantly agreed to Nobel Prize winner Mohamad ElBaraadei’s plan to allow Russia to reprocess Iran’s enriched uranium.  Only weeks before ElBaradei weighed in, the U.N. Security Council was faced with growing prospects of more draconic sanctions, and possible military options, to stop Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program.  Since booting out ElBaradei’s nuclear inspectors in 2004, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad gave the former Bush administration fits about Iran’s nuclear program.  With the help of Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan—the father of Pakistan’s A-bomb—and atomic technology from France and Russia, Iran was able to build up its enrichment program to an estimated 9,000 centrifuges, yielding roughly 2,600 pounds of U-238.

            Agreeing in principle today in Vienna to allow Russia to reprocess low-grade-uranium, Iran avoided more serious consequence for refusing to suspend its uranium enrichment program.  Since coming to office in 2005, Ahmadinejad defended Iran’s rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to complete the nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes, specifically generating electricity.  Ahamadinejad has denied Western claims that Iran seeks to build its first A-bomb.  Iran has said for some time that it has an inalienable right to enrich uranium.  Western arms’ experts conjecture that Iran is between 1-3 years from a crude nuclear bomb. They also believe Iran has enough enriched uranium for at least one warhead.   Israeli officials, especially conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have warned Iran about possible military consequences of continuing to enrich uranium.

            Today’s developments in Vienna on the diplomatic front buy Iran more time and stymie Western threats for more sanctions and possible military options. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s chief negotiator to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, said ElBaradei’s plan was “on the right track" but uncertain of Tehran’s reaction.  “We have to thoroughly study this text and also [need] further elaboration in capitals,” said Soltanieh, offering no promises.  Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, titular head of Iran’s Revolutionary Gurards, and Ahmadinejad have opposed all prior demands by the U.S. and U.N. to suspend or in any way modify its uranium enrichment program.  Iran’s leaders believe it’s well-within their rights—and nuclear capability—to continue enriching uranium to its logical conclusion, including any or all commercial and military applications             

            Israel’s reaction came swiftly to ElBaradei’s announcement of a possible breakthrough.  When making concessions and saving face, it doesn’t help things for Iran’s adversaries to make public remarks or rub it in.   “This proves just how much international pressure is significant,” Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai told Israeli Public Radio.  If Khamenei or Ahmadinejad perceive any humiliation, they’ll reject the deal and prolong the process.  U.S. authorities reacted positively to ElBaradei’s developments.  “It was acceptable to our team there, but wee want to give it . . . a chance to be seen by a broader range of people in the interagency here.  But I expect we’ll be able to approve it,” signaling a more conciliatory stand than the Bush administration.  ElBaradei got Soltanieh to agree to ship 75% of Iran’s enriched uranium to Russia for reprocessing.

            Winning the Nobel Peace Prize Oct. 9, President Barack Obama, who originally gave Tehran until the end of the year to stop enriching uranium, looks content to let fellow Nobel laureate ElBaradei do the heavy lifting.  Both Soltanieh and Iran’s vice president and head of the national nuclear agency Ali Salehi trust ElBaradei far more than members of the U.N. Security Council.  Whether of not Tehran bites at ElBaradei’s proposal is anyone’s guess.  Judging by past behavior and public remarks, it’s unlikely.  “They lose their leverage in terms of being able to create a nuclear weapon,” said a senior unnamed diplomat closely tied to the Geneva talks “doubted” whether Tehran was ready to give up enriching uranium.  All past indications point toward Tehran rejecting ElBaradei’s proposal.  More public remarks from Israel or pressure from the U.S. won’t sit well with Iran’s mullahs.

        High hopes and unrealistic expectations plague the Vienna talks.  While Soltanieh seems aligned with Western powers, his counterpoints in Tehran aren’t on the same page.  Joining the chorus of international pressure, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton urged Tehran to act promptly, insisting dialogue “cannot be open-ended,” potentially weighing on Iran’s leaders.  “We are not prepared to talk for the sake of talking,” Hillary told the U.S. Institute for Peace in Washington.  Given the delicate nature of today’s discussions, letting ElBaradei to the talking would yield more fruit.  More idle threats antagonizes the Islamic Republic, reducing chances that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad would go along.  Whatever the outcome of ElBaradei’s proposal, Tehran could replace the enriched uranium in one year.  Toning down the rhetoric and letting ElBaradei spread some good will can only help..

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news.  He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.


Homene.net" target="_blank">img height="30" width="138" src="http://onlinecolumnist.com/images/websiteBy.gif" border="0" align="absmiddle">

©1999-2002 Discobolos Consulting Services, Inc.
(310) 204-8300
All Rights Reserved.