Jihadists' Group-Think

by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright October 3, 2004
All Rights Reserved.

hedding light on radical Islam, CIA forensic psychiatrist Marc Sagerman studied 172 cases of “jihadists” or holy warriors, trying to get a handle on the mentality of Muslim extremists. Publishing his new book “Understanding Terror Networks,” Sagerman hopes to explain how radicals pulled off events like Sept. 11, where group suicide accompanies acts of mass destruction. Sagerman called the 9/11 terrorists “a bunch of guys,” explaining how a close knit group of Islamic radicals managed to plot, implement and pull off the most deadly terrorist attack in world history. Sagerman studied the Hamburg Al Qaeda cell, where Mohamed Atta orchestrated a group of 19 hyjackers to decimate the World Trade Center and Pentagon. To Sagerman, the inner workings of the terrorist's mind offers less than understanding the group dynamics of Islamic radicals.

     Sagerman finds that group dynamics—not religion—offers the best explanation for suicide bombers. It's a group phenomenon. To search for individual characteristic in order to explain them is totally misleading. It will lead you to a dead end,” said Sagerman, speaking in Paris at a conference for academics and law enforcement officials. Sagerman believes that strong group affiliations lead to deadly terrorist actions. Developing close relationships based on a mutual love of Islam and hate for the West leads to action toward terrorist goals. Sagerman has difficulty explaining how rational human beings are somehow transformed into suicide machines. He doesn't believe Al Qaeda actively recruits suicide bombers, or, for that matter, spends time brainwashing recruits. He sees terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden as providing inspiration and money, not acts of conversion.

     According to Sagerman, “joining Al Qaeda is more akin to the process of applying to a selective college,” yet he somehow overlooks that the recruitment process creates the “cognitive dissonance” making recruits more committed to the cause. Sacrificing time, energy and money, jumping through hoops, and telling recruits that they're somehow getting into a selective club has all the trappings of recruitment methods used by secular and religious cults. “Many try to get in, but only a few succeed, and the college's role is evaluation and selection rather than marketing,” said Sagerman, totally missing that exclusivity breeds the “cognitive dissonance” leading to coerced commitment. Sagerman misses the fact that young, disenfranchised Muslims are ripe for the picking, as they would be for any cult. Social affiliation alone doesn't recruit anyone into suicidal cults.

     It's been well documented that Al Qaeda frequently goes to mosques, prisons and other settings where young Muslim males hang out. At these places, they size up the right combination of traits that make malleable jihadists or holy warriors. Once contacted, Muslim males are asked to give up other relationships and contact and confine themselves to Al Qaeda. Sagerman knows first hand how jihadist swear allegiance to “the sheik,” referring to Bin Laden as their inspiration, spiritual master and leader of the pan-Islamic movement, restoring Islam to its past glory. All recruits accept the U.S. and Israeli as archenemies, swearing allegiance to the destruction of both states. Sagerman rejects the idea that the CIA created Al Qaeda to fight Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the early 1980s. Since those days, he has great respect for Bin Laden's mujahedin or holy warriors.

     While Sagerman studied jihadists from middle and upper class backgrounds, he doesn't get that Al Qaeda recruits cross the socioeconomic spectrum. Recruiting individuals into suicide cults involves more than offering social fraternity. Religious fanaticism plays a decisive role for suicide missions, where rational individuals refuse to sacrifice their young lives. Only religious zealots can be convinced that 72 vigins await them in the afterlife. Sagerman believes the social connection takes precedence over religious obsessions. Only carefully conditioned beliefs in the afterlife can propel individuals into suicide missions. Social networking, even for the most disenfranchised, can't persuade recruits to sacrifice their lives. Promising only closeness or social bonding won't recruit new suicide bombers. Islamic radicals must have the right mix of hatred and religious fanaticism

     Looking at the bigger picture, it's unrealistic to think that young Muslims simply join suicide cults because they seek better social relations. Fanaticism breeds the kind of susceptibility to recruitment found in 50% of the adult male population. Promising cash and other incentives proves irresistible to Muslims unable to fit in to today's post-industrial world. Sagerman did find out that most jihadists become religious fanatics later in life, after a powerful conversion experience. Recent Islamic converts and devotees make the most fanatical suicide bombers. Above anything else, most jihadists seek to destroy the American or Israeli way of life. What Sagerman doesn't get is that Islamic radicals are a different breed, prone toward religious fanaticism. Not everyone fits this bill. Whether young or old, rich or poor, Islamic radicals seek more than a better social life.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.


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