by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright October 1, 2005
All Rights Reserved.

lip-flopping again on its Iraq policy, the Pentagon now sees the 149,000 U.S. troops as part of the problem. Since Cruise missiles hit Baghdad March 20, 2003, the debate raged over the right quantity of troops. Shortly after Saddam's fall, a bloody insurgency, comprised of both Baath-loyalists and foreign terrorists seeking to expel U.S. occupation, has derailed President George W. Bush's plans to establish a permanent and stable democracy in Iraq. Growing ethnic strife, Sunni rejection of Iraq's new constitution and a relentless effort by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to attack Iraq's majority Shiite population has increased prospects of civil war. While some U.S. lawmakers have argued for more troops, including maverick Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), most have refused to augment U.S. forces, believing that (a) it wouldn't work and (b) there's no public support.

      Promising to ramp up Iraqi forces, President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld have stubbornly refused setting a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. In theory, Iraq's new forces were supposed to take the handoff from U.S. troops, eventually achieving autonomy for Iraq's security. So far, that hasn't happened, approaching the unthinkable milestone of 2,000 U.S. deaths. Bush insists that premature withdrawal sends a dangerous message to the enemy about weakened U.S. resolve. Now Bush's own commanders in Iraq indicate that current troop levels have created a counterproductive dependency on U.S. forces. “It means they recognize that there is a cost to staying just as there is a benefit to staying. And this has not really been factored in a central part of the strategy before,” said Michael O'Hanlon, a senior defense analyst at the Brooking Institution in Washington.

      Analyzing the situation in Iraq pales in comparison to deciphering the White House and Pentagon communication strategy, focused on saving face and salvaging flagging public opinion. Hinting that he sees a need possible troop reductions, Rumseld now concedes the battle against insurgents will not be won by U.S. troops. “They're [Iraqi forces] going to have to cope with that insurgency over time. They are ultimately going to be the ones who win over that insurgency,” said Rumsfeld back in June, admitting that the outcome depends on the new Iraq. So far, the White House and Pentagon haven't admitted that a substantial portion of Iraq's newly trained armed forces and security services have loyalty to the terrorists, and, yes, foreign governments supporting the insurgency, including Iran, Syria, Russia and Communist China, all determined to see the U.S. fail.

      Neither the White House nor the Pentagon have dealt with the inescapable reality that foreign governments—two of which sit on the U.N. Security Council—have played a decisive role in supplying arms to Saddam loyalists and foreign terrorists fighting U.S. occupation. What happened to the Bush Doctrine that any government supporting terrorism would be regarded as rogue state by the U.S. government? Bush has frequently defined the Iraq mission as one of defeating terrorists. “When the mission of defeating the terrorists in Iraq is complete, our troops will come home,” said Bush, linking Iraq to the broader war on terror. More recently, he has redefined the mission to helping Iraqi troops to defeat terrorists. Bush and the Pentagon haven't dealt with the undeniable disloyalty inside Iraq's new forces, contributing to carefully planned attacks on U.S. troops and civilian security personnel.

      In recent testimony before Congress, Army Gen. George W. Casey indicated that reducing U.S. forces was needed to diminish the perception of U.S. occupation. Central Command's Gen. John P. Abizaid, who supervises the Iraq and Afghan theater, also concurs that to “reduce our military footprint” across the region would help enlist support from local governments. Reading between the lines, these statements reflect the failure of the Iraq policy that (a) no amount of U.S. troops would ever be enough and (b) Iraqis, regardless of the outcome, do not want U.S. occupation. Suggesting that fewer U.S. troops would somehow reverse the insurgency borders on hallucination. “This is about dependency,” said Casey, insisting that Iraqis play a bigger part in their own security. Before that happens, Iraqis need to decide whether they're loyal to the new government or insurgents fighting U.S. occupation.

      Approaching 2,000 U.S. casualties, the White House needs to revise its policy that troop withdrawals somehow “dishonor the dead.” President Bush has a solemn duty to protect the American public, including U.S. troops. It doesn't protect the American public to increase U.S. military deaths. Keeping U.S. troops in an endless shooting gallery does little to improve national security. Withdrawing troops, or better yet, employing a coherent exit strategy, doesn't “dishonor the dead,” it recognizes the diminishing returns and brutal costs associated with an untenable situation. Calling for troop reductions to lower Iraq's dependence on U.S. forces doesn't save face or undo a failed policy. Instead of speculating about whether Iraqis can mange their own security, the White House and Pentagon should coldly reevaluate whether the current policy serves the national interest.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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