by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright Sept. 21, 2009
All Rights Reserved.

          Faced with mounting pressure, President Barack Obama must fish or cut bait in Afghanistan.  Mounting U.S. casualties and a growing Taliban insurgency indicate that the path to victory is far from certain.  Speaking about excerpts from a classified report by Afghanistian’s to commander Gen. Stanley McChyrstal suggest that more troops are needed to reverse a deteriorating situation.  “Resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it,” said McChrystal in a five-page summary urging the president to add more troops.  Barack campaigned on the promise to end the Iraq War and shift resources to Afghanistan, the real war on terror.  While good for a campaign slogan, real American lives are being lost daily in Afghanistan with no end in sight.  Obama knows acutely well the cost of inaction, watching the biggest jump in U.S. casualties since the war began Oct. 7, 2001.

            Barack now reviews McChrystal’s 66-page report detailing the complicated variables at play in Afghanistan.  Since the Taliban was toppled Dec. 8, 2001, the U.S. has dealt with a determined guerilla war, fighting in the trenches to reinstate the same Islamic extremism that drove Osama bin Laden to decimate the World Trade Center Twin Towers and part of the Pentagon.  “Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall effort is deteriorating,” said McChystal, neither defining the mission nor “victory.”  Soon after taking office, Barack ordered an additional 21,000 troops, bringing the U.S. total to 68,000, together with 38,000 NATO troops.  Suffering more and more casualties, NATO currently reassesses troop strength, but, more importantly, the current mission that leaves its forces more vulnerable.

            When former President George W. Bush ordered Operation Enduring Freedom Oct. 7, 2001, the mission was to find and terminate the command of Osama bin Laden, his al-Qaida terror group and his Taliban support found in Afghan’s government.  Bush successfully toppled the Taliban but couldn’t get Bin Laden or eliminate his multi-layered terror organization.  Adding 21,000 troops and refocusing U.S. efforts in Afghanistan has quintupled U.S. casualty rates since April.  McChrystal assures more deterioration and failure with current troop-levels but can’t guarantee “victory” with increased troop strength.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mike Mullen concurs with McChrystal’s assessment to increase U.S. troop strength.  He also doesn’t define the mission other than trying to restrain the Taliban insurgency, taking a toll on U.S. forces.

            Showing signs that he’s reconsidering his original plan, Obama seems more reluctant to add more troops to escalate the war.  “The only thing I’ve said is (a) I want an unvarnished assessment but (b) I don’t want to put the resource question before the strategy question,” said Barack, hinting at his reluctance to simply grant a troop request.  Whatever Bush’s mission in 2001, it’s morphed into fighting the Taliban to preserve the Karzai government.  More recent missions have focused on going after opium farmers that currently use the Taliban as a de facto militia.  Going after opium farmers is an unrealistic mission, where powerful warlords show more loyalty to the Taliban than the Karzai government or U.S. military.  With the Taliban looming in the background and al-Qaida running amok in Pakistan, the U.S. mission has been diverted to Afghanistan opium trade.

            Republican senators, led by former presidential candidate Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), are leading the charge for a troop surge.  McCain wants to add troops but can’t define the strategy or mission, leaving the outcome in doubt.  As McChyrstal points out, there are no guarantees by adding more troops.  Obama’s last decision to add 21,000 more troops last April have only increased U.S. casualty rates.  Afghanistan’s feudal system and lack of a centralized government make military efforts less tenable.  Unlike Iraq where the military paid off certain Shiite and Sunni groups to oppose insurgents, it’s difficult to compete with the opium trade.  “The way forward in Afghanistan . . .  is more complex than just the security aspect of it,” said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman, admitting the uphill battle of convincing Afghanistan’s many factions to go along with the U.S. military.

            Barack weighs a fateful decision on whether or not to send more troops to Afghanistan.  Reluctantly scaling back the Iraq War, Republicans in Congress generally support increased troops in Afghanistan.  Bush started Operation Enduring Freedom Oct. 7, 2001 with the expressed mission of toppling the Taliban and terminating Osama bin Laden’s command.  Nearly eight years later, the Taliban hasn’t returned to power but threatens to eventually destabilize the Karzai government.  Attempts to capture or kill the mastermind of Sept. 11 have failed so far, with little hope of success.  For whatever reason, the combined might of the U.S. military and intelligence community hasn’t worked.  While the Taliban remains out of power, their minions enjoy the support of Afghanistan’s powerful opium trade.  Going after the opium trade is both unrealistic and can only lead to bad results.

 John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news.  He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.