by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright September 21, 2002
All Rights Reserved.

inally coming to grips with the disgraceful intelligence failure on Sept. 11, a joint House and Senate Intelligence Committee preliminary report indicated that spy agencies dropped the ball. While hindsight's 20/20, the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation and National Security Agency disavowed accountability since 9/11. Testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee in May, CIA director George J. Tenet bristled at the suggestion that Sept. 11 was a stunning intelligence failure. "We now know that our inability to detect and prevent Sept. 11, attacks was an intelligence failure of unprecedented magnitude," said Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala.), ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee. Of all people, Tenet should know better after declaring "war" on Al Qaeda in 1998, following the bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa. Yet Tenet never deployed agents and resources to hunt down and destroy Bin Laden's terror organization.

      Without sufficient intelligence—the ability to intercept terrorist plots before they occur—the White House switched gears, replacing 57-years of deterrence with the new doctrine of preemption or "anticipatory self-defense." It's precisely the abysmal intelligence failure that led to the change in national security policy, now rankling friends and foes at the United Nations. Instead of going about national security quietly, the U.S. now threatens enemies with preemptive action. Good intelligence—and covert operations—is the best preventive medicine, allowing authorities to ambush dangers before they get out of hand. Announcing new doctrines with great fanfare puts allies and adversaries on the defensive, criticizing the U.S. for flouting sovereignty and international law. Even multinationalists like U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognize the right of self-defense, but have trouble with preemptive strategies that bypass diplomatic channels.

      Congress launched its own investigation into intelligence failures on Sept. 11 to ascertain how to fix the problem. Stubborn denials by spy agencies and the White House prompted a comprehensive nonpartisan review to prevent future incidents. "I don't think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center . . . that they would try to use an airplane as a missile," said National Security Advisor Condolezza Rice, totally contradicting repeated reports since 1995 that terrorists were planning airplane-hijacking suicide missions. While no smoking gun, congressional investigators found plenty of threats in over 400,000 declassified documents, including a plot to use airliners as missiles, hatched by none other than Al Qaeda fugitive Khalid Shaikh Mohammed—the overseas mastermind of Sept. 11. Even after Al Qaeda blew up the destroyer U.S.S. Cole in Yemen's port of Aden, killing 17 sailors, U.S. authorities gave Bin Laden a free pass. Only after 9/11 did the U.S. finally heed the growing danger of Islamic extremism.

      Congressional investigators found that the FBI received warning in 1998 that Islamic radicals planned to crash hijacked airliners into the World Trade Center. Later in 1998, intelligence agencies received warnings that "Osama bin Laden's next operation could possibly involve flying an aircraft into a U.S. airport and detonating it," suggesting, at the very least, that Dr. Rice was either clueless or holding back pertinent intelligence. Even more ominous was a report from FBI offices in Newark, N.J. that a Pakistani man, trained by Bin Laden in Afghanistan, warned agents he was recruited to participate in an airline hijacking and "there would be pilots among the hijacking team." In July 2001, an FBI agent in Phoenix issued a memo warning superiors that suicide bombers were currently training at U.S. flight schools. Yet the FBI did little to investigate and arrest suspected terrorists, fearing violations in civil liberties. All spy agencies—including the White House—must own up to falling asleep at the switch, permitting terrorists to complete their plans. Connecting the dots, while not easy, involves taking threats seriously and sharing intelligence with appropriate authorities.

      Intelligence failures force the government to use the doctrine of preemption or "anticipatory self-defense" to fend off impending threats. Since 9/11, multilateral approaches haven't yielded enough intelligence to stave off growing dangers. No one wants to take unilateral action, but when intelligence and covert operations can't stop future attacks, military intervention becomes a last ditch option. Allowing rogue nations like Iraq to develop and stockpile weapons of mass destruction invites disaster, leaving the U.S. vulnerable to a first strike. Deterrence—namely, Mutual Assured Destruction—worked with countries with something to lose, not shadowy terrorists plotting deadly surprise attacks. Bush's new doctrine of preemption correctly recognizes that "deterrence and containment" don't work in the new age of global terrorism. Before better intelligence and covert operations catch up, "anticipatory self-defense" must rule national security.

      Foreign nations haven't yet caught up to growing realities in the face of today's global terrorism. "Some people who couldn't . . . utter the words 'intelligence failure' are now convinced of it," said Sen. Shelby taking a shot at CIA director Tenet for stubbornly denying that his agency needs to get up to speed. While there's plenty of blame to pass around, critics must also acknowledge that global terrorism complicates information gathering and covert operations. Penetrating moving targets like Al Qaeda is far more difficult than immovable objects like the Kremlin. Bush smartly recognized gaping holes in U.S. intelligence, leaving few options other than the doctrine of preemption to protect national security. While intelligence agencies catch up, the U.N. must adjust to new realities and recognize that multilateral approaches can't prevent future 9/11s. National security agencies must control egos, share intelligence and strive to compensate for each other's weaknesses. Until better intelligence and covert operations meet today's terrorist threats, the doctrine of preemption is here to stay.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's a consultant and expert in strategic communication. He's author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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