Al Qaeda's Invisible Man

by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright August 16, 2004
All Rights Reserved.

hen U.S. forces cornered Osama bin Laden in Dec. 2002 at Tora Bora, the White House had high hopes that the elusive terrorist would be captured. After pounding his cave complexes with 1,000-pound fuel-air-explosive Daisy Cutters, the military was hopeful they finally ended Bin Laden's 10-year reign of terror. Yet, despite having access to Pakistan to seal off Al Qaeda's escape routes, the Pentagon opted instead to defer the task to the Pakistani army, who promptly allowed the slippery terrorist, his entourage and remnants of the Taliban to escape. Considered all but dead by the Pentagon, Bin Laden remerged via videotape thanks to Al Jazeera TV, calling on Muslims to wage holy war against the U.S. Less than three months before presidential elections, it's highly unlikely that Bush will pull Bin Laden out of his hat, leaving the war on terror in doubt.

      Since Dec. 2002, there have been numerous false alarms, promising to get Bin Laden or other “high-value” targets. While other Al Qaeda or Taliban figures have been killed or captured, the Pentagon ballyhooed a variety of “small fish,” highlighting its great successes. “With regard to Osama bin Laden himself, I would say that we are not getting any substantial leads yet,” said Brig. Javed Iqbal Cheema, head of Pakistan's National Crisis Management Cell at the Interior Ministry, expressing doubt that Bin Laden was anywhere in sight. Nearly three years after Sept. 11, the best domestic and foreign intelligence services have no clue about Bin Laden's whereabouts rings hollow. After all, Pakistan has used Bin Laden's mujahedeen fighters to battle India to a standoff in Kashmir. Suggesting that Pakistan remains clueless about Bin Laden simply doesn't add up.

      Recent warnings by U.S. Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge and Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft, raising the terror alert to orange, about possible terrorist attacks at the nation's premier financial institutions, stem from the capture of 25-year-old Pakistani Naeem Noor Khan, a computer specialist with alleged ties to Al Qaeda. Khan supposedly worked undercover with Pakistani intelligence, gaining key information about Bin Laden., his first lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahri and the one-eyed Taliban chief Mullah Mohamed Omar. “Undoubtedly, we a received some information, and all the arrests at the Al Qaeda leadership level bring us closer toward reaching the desired objective,” Pakistan's Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat, implying that Khan deeply penetrated Bin Laden's network. Yet Al Qaeda's network relies on semiautonomous cells, leaving regional patsies in the dark.

      Pakinstan's longstanding reliance on Bin Laden's “holy warriors,” a mercenary army of renegade Arabs, makes Hayat's remarks suspicious, especially considering Pakistan's close working relationship with Al Qaeda. Since Sept. 11, Pakistan strongman Gen. Pervez Musharaf has played a dangerous game of placating U.S. demands, while, at the same time, aiding and abetting his old comrade Osama bin Laden. Even if Musharaf wanted to cooperate, his Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI, wouldn't betray one of its key benefactors. Musharaf has already survived at least two assassination attempts by terrorists loyal to Bin Laden. Before Musharaf gains an upper-hand in Kashmir, he must rely heavily on Al Qaeda. After battling for 57 years, India shows no signs of backing down. Musharaf finds himself torn between Islamic militants battling India and those out to get him.

      It's utterly naïve thinking that Pakistan remains a strategic ally, when in fact Musharaf let Bin Laden escape from Tora Bora. Musharaf recently pardoned his chief nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, after learning he sold nuclear technology to Iran—a country, unlike Iraq, that poses a real threat to U.S. national security and its regional allies. Musharhf pays lip-service cooperating with the U.S. war on terror, while, simultaneously, enlisting Islamo-fascists like Al Qaeda to do his dirty work in Kashmir. It wasn't that long ago that late President Ronald Reagan authorized the CIA to covertly fund Osama bin Laden to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Tables turned when Bin Laden began his relentless terror campaign in 1993 with the bombing of the World Trade Center, Khobar Towers in 1996, U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, U.S.S. Cole in 2000 and ultimately Sept. 11.

      Getting Bin Laden has been complicated by his many twisted relationships with old adversaries and new friends. As long as he's still fighting Pakistan's war in Kashmir, it's unlikely Musharaf will cooperate any more than he has with nuclear non-proliferation, creating fits at the State Department and perhaps the next hotspot in the war on terror—Iran. It's difficult to pinpoint the Pentagon's rationale for dishing Bin Laden's capture to the Pakistani military. Judging by recent statements out of Karachi, it's clear that Pakistan gives aid and comfort to the America's number one enemy. Whatever happens in Kashmir, Bin Laden will continue his conflicted relationship with Pakistan. In order for the U.S. to get a real crack at Bin Laden, it must figure a way out of Iraq and contain a growing Iranian threat. With Tehran currently sheltering Al Qaeda, it's time to get the war on terror back on track.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.


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