by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright July 27, 2005
All Rights Reserved.

wo-and-a-half years since Columbia disintegrated on reentry due to excessive heat from damaged heat-protective tiles killing all seven crew-members, NASA triumphantly returned to space, blasting Discovery off the launch pad at Kennedy Space Center, Fla. But no sooner than engineers stopped celebrating, reports surfaced about damage to the orbiter's delicate exterior tile insulation. NASA's new laser camera picked up a 1 1/2 inch gash in a tile on the nose landing gear door, damaged apparently by more debris during takeoff, the same problem that caused Columbia's fatal voyage Feb 1, 2003. “It's premature to say there is a serious problem. I'm not going to sugarcoat anything,” said John Shannon, NASA's flight operations and integration manager. Columbia's Accident Investigation Board required NASA to fix problem that led to the last disaster—yet the same problem returns.

      When the space shuttle Columbia first blasted off Jan. 20, 1981, it was supposed to revolutionize space travel from the cumbersome pod-shaped crafts of the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo missions, requiring parachuted ocean landings. Astronauts could fly the orbiter from outer space to a designated runway, giving added maneuverability. Before the Challenger disaster Jan. 28, 1986, few people questioned the orbiters design or safety—though that mishap was blamed on faulty “O”-rings on the orbiter's solid rocket boosters. It wasn't until the Columbia tragedy that questions were raised about the orbiter's flawed engineering, namely, the Mickey-Moused heat shields. It shocked many to find out that the same tiles and adhesives used in your shower were used on the space shuttle. In 31missions with Mercury, Gemini, Apollo/Sky-lab, only three deaths occurred on Apollo 1 in freak launch pad fire Jan. 27, 1967.

      Over the years, few government agencies have had slicker public relations than NASA, inspiring unqualified confidence in its scientists and mission. Since the Challenger disaster, doubts were raised about the orbiter's safety and space-worthiness. Few questioned design problems or, for that matter, the shuttle's obsolescence in the next generation of space flight. When Columbia went down, it raised serious questions about the shuttle program, not only its safety but its overall purpose. Without Apollo's six spectacular moon landings, the shuttle was relegated to a sort of taxi service to the international space station, though experiments continued. Before Columbia exploded, concerns surfaced about the antiquated shuttle program. When China launched its first manned space flight Shenzhou-5 Oct. 15, 2003 in an Apollo-like design, concerns emerged about the shuttle's future.

      NASA'S best minds didn't anticipate the growing obsolescence of the shuttle program, until Columbia was lost, and more recently, until China adopted the old pod-shaped design. After NASA retired its Apollo/Soyuz fleet in 1975, there was a six-year moratorium on manned space flight until Columbia launched in 1981. Even assuming NASA continues shuttled flights until 2010, there's nothing in the works for the next generation of manned flight. While President George W. Bush talked about a manned mission to Mars, NASA hasn't figured out the next design of space ships. China promised to land on the moon sometime in the future. But so far, NASA hasn't announced anything other than retrofitting aging shuttles. NASA administrator Michael D. Griffin may be euphoric and awe-struck by Discovery's return to space but that doesn't address the future.

      Getting back to space was NASA's priority to win back a losing PR battle that now has the American people doubting the once unassailable space agency. Problems with the orbiter are just one small part of the myopia crippling the U.S. space program. China's recent launch slapped NASA in the face, telling the beleaguered space program that it put all it put all its eggs in the wrong basket. “Take note of what you saw here today,” said a wide-eyed Griffin, thrilled that the shuttle was back in flight. “The power and the majesty of the lunch, but also the competence and professionalism, the sheer gall and pluckiness that pulled this program out of the depths of despair 2 1/2 years ago and made it fly,” ignoring (a) whether the shuttle was really safe to fly, but more importantly (b) whether it was time to retire the shuttle and develop a new space vehicle. Yes, NASA has many fine engineers but it's bereft of executive leadership.

      God willing, the Discovery will reenter earth's atmosphere without melting down like Columbia. Japanese astronaut Soichi Noguchi has his work cut out for him, trying to repair the damaged tile. Hopefully, the damage is superficial and won't compromise the orbiter's hermetic seal. “Depth is everything,” said Shannon, praying that yesterday's damage won't cause serious problems. But once the Discovery safely lands, NASA must take a searching inventory to overhaul an obsolete space program, especially a management team lacking vision and leadership. “It is a misnomer that public support ever flagged,” said William F. Ready, revealing the depth of bureaucratic denial and resistance that plagues the space program. NASA must wake up, change its defensive thinking and begin the painful process of overhauling its program. That's the way to get the public back onboard.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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