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| Kosovo's War of Words
by John M. Curtis Copyright June 21, 1999
"Your people should be ashamed, because you are getting ready to use force against a small European nation because it protects its territory against separatism and its people against terrorism," said a defiant Slobodan Milosevic signaling the heartbreaking collapse of the Rambouillet peace accords. For more than two months prior to NATO’s bombing campaign, secretary of state Madeleine Albright and her emissary Richard Holbrooke, attempted to impose an uncompromising condition that the fate of Kosovo [its sovereignty] was subject to negotiation. On that point, Milosevic made it plain that there would be no compromise. Guess what? After taking the allies’ best shots, he still hasn’t compromised. In fact, the most recent U.N. approved 'peace' accord assures the Serb’s sovereignty in Kosovo. How much progress have we really made now that the fate of Kosovo still hasn’t changed hands? Serbia’s recalcitrance to a negotiated settlement hinged on preserving the sovereignty of their [the Serbs] 'sacred' province. When Holbrooke returned to Brussels following his last ditch meeting with Slobodan Milosevic on March 22, 1999, president Clinton announced, "If President Milosevic continues to choose aggression over peace, NATO’s military plans must continue to move forward," signaling the beginning of the war. Retracing our steps, it should be clear to everyone that the bombing began when Milosevic spurned secretary of state Albright’s ultimatum at Rambouillet, namely, that the Serbs had to accept the eventual secession of Kosovo. That — and only that — was the sticking point. With the U.S. already backed into a corner, the White House couldn’t withdraw that condition without appearing to have caved-in to Milosevic. Despite the grumbling, was the U.S.’s credibility really at stake? If the State Department and NATO acquiesced to that demand to end the war with Serbia, why didn’t they accept that condition in the first place and avoid the whole mess? Would that really set such a dangerous precedent? Isn’t it a lot more dangerous to set untenable conditions, botch otherwise doable negotiations, push matters to the brink, and either face intolerable humiliation or be forced to flex military muscle? What’s worse: fail to negotiate or negotiate to fail? Wouldn’t NATO have accepted any reasonable settlement to prevent an avoidable war? Isn’t peace through diplomacy the new world order’s highest aspiration? Despite Clinton’s 'third way' policy, isn’t brute force a last resort. What message is now sent: Accept the U.S. terms and conditions or face Tomahawk cruise missiles? Most people outside of the administration would have gone the extra distance and entertained all reasonable proposals. Brimming with frustration, secretary of state Albright said, after sending ambassador Holbrooke to Belgrade [one last time], "that the U.S. has gone the extra mile." Did we really? It’s a well known fact that Holbrooke’s last meeting with Milosevic offered no new proposals, appeared blatantly perfunctory and essentially restated a provocative ultimatum: Sign or else. No matter how repugnant the Milosevic regime, launching a devastating air-war, exacerbating the persecution and misery of ethnic Albanians [and innocent Serbs], and systematically destroying the infrastructure of a poor, backward nation hardly represents a victory for the Western Alliance. Age-old ethnic hatreds aren’t going to be solved by bombing deviant countries into submission. Yes, there’s a point at which malignant despots can no longer be placated, but there’s also value now to examining how and why high-level diplomacy failed. With the U.S. intelligence studying Serbian troop movements and paramilitary operations for months during the brutal crackdown and 'ethnic cleansing,' the U.S. State Department wasn’t shouting 'genocide' and openly comparing Slobodan Milosevic to Adolf Hitler. Nor were there worries that the Kosovo civil war would spread to neighboring countries and destabilize Europe. But once the bombs began dropping, the administration’s rationale shifted positions: Early in the day they were protecting American interests. At noon they were stopping the spread of a dangerous civil war. In the evening they were rescuing Kosovo from Europe’s next genocidal maniac. After president Clinton hosted an evening with holocaust survivor and Nobel prize winner Elie Wiesel, the administration hit its stride and found a politically correct rationale. They were drawing the line against genocide. Who could argue with that? Once the war began, the Serbs escalated their brutal persecution of ethnic Albanians. If the U.S. and the allies were really concerned about protecting the Kosovars, why did we allow an antiseptic air-war to go on for six weeks? How was it possible to stop the slaughterhouse occurring on the ground? If the war weren’t worth risking American lives, maybe we shouldn’t have intervened at all. As it was, we wreaked untold trauma and misery on the streams of refugees fleeing for their lives without adequate contingency plans. How could the State Department miscalculate so badly? Milosevic didn’t roll-over and the Serbs retaliated by brutally attacking the Albanian population. Where’s the evidence to support the administration’s claim that the Serbs were planning this stepped up aggression? With Kosovo now in nearly complete anarchy and with NATO forces blown up in camouflaged minefields, what have we learned for the next time around? About the Author John M. Curtis is director of a West Los Angeles think tank specializing in human behavior, health care and political research and media consultation. He’s a seminar trainer, columnist and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma. |
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ugoslavia cannot be threatened nor obliged by force to sign something she does not want," said a prophetic Zivadin Janovic, Yugoslav foreign minister, only days before NATO bombs rained down on key targets in Serbia. In the same breath, Janovic continued, "Bombs thrown any place in Serbia would kill any prospect for a political, democratic solution... they will kill any negotiations." So much for 'psychic' predictions. Six weeks later, after the most devastating air-campaign since the bombing of Cambodia, with nearly 60% of Serbia’s infrastructure in total ruins, Slobodan Milosevic finally threw in the towel — or did he?|
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