by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright May 22, 2004
All Rights Reserved.

torming the posh residence of Ahmad Chalabi, U.S. troops served notice that the once darling of the White House, Pentagon and CIA fell from grace. Chalabi, a prominent Shiite exile and head of the now dubious Iraqi National Congress, received untold millions from the Pentagon and CIA for “invaluable” intelligence, designed since the first Gulf War to topple Saddam Hussein. He was President Bush's key point man on Iraq, sharing a private booth with First Lady Laura Bush at last year's State-of-the-Union message. It was, after all, primarily Chalabi's intelligence that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell based his Feb. 6, 2003 speech to the U.N. Security Council, warning about Saddam's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, especially alleged mobile weapons' labs. When U.S. forces verified that no such labs existed, Chalabi became a major political liability.

      Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Chalabi told the Pentagon that U.S. troops would be greeted by flag-waving Iraqis, not Kalashanakovs and rocket-propelled grenades. Now that Chalabi has been outed as a fraud, especially supplying the phony intelligence on which the White House rushed to war, he's regarded as a risky political liability. Raiding his home in Baghdad's upscale Mansur district, Chalabi has become a well-deserved pariah. Chalabi once held private meetings with Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald M. Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and former Pentagon advisor and “neocon” architect Richard Perle. Without a strong CIA presence in Iraq, Chalabi became the U.S. government's eyes-and-ears. Put on the payroll after the first Gulf War, Chalabi had free reign to feed the Pentagon endless lies.

      Convicted of bank fraud in Jordan in 1989, Chalabi allegedly looted $70 million from Petra Bank before his sordid history with the CIA. After the first Gulf War, Chalabi went on the Pentagon payroll, promising to sabotage Saddam's regime. He was discredited and fired after an aborted coup in 1995. Sometime after Bush's inauguration in 2001, he was put back on the payroll. Between then and the start of Gulf War II, Chalabi took another $27 million, positioning himself to take over the Iraq Governing Council. “I figure, he's not going to end up with less than the No. 2 or No. 3 position in the new government,” said an unnamed high-ranking U.S. official, marveling at Chalabi's staying power. Swirling suspicions about Chalabi—or someone in his organization—passing U.S. secrets to Iran finally forced the Pentagon to sever relations—something long overdue.

      With Iraq's sovereignty now on the fast track for June 30 and Bush facing a bruising campaign, Chalabi presents an unavoidable liability. Without boots on the ground, the Pentagon relied on characters like Chalabi for intelligence. Revelations at Guantanamo Bay and Iraq's Abu Ghraib prision prove that you can't rely on detainees or former defectors for actionable intelligence. Abusing prisoners doesn't yield useful intel, no matter how urgent the situation. Paying defectors like Chalabi gave the Pentagon fits, trying to sort out distortions from reality. Raiding Chalabi's home officially ends the relationship with one of the Pentagon's key spies. When U.N. special envoy Lackdar Brahimi picks Iraq's new government, Chalabi hoped to be high on the list. Now that he's utterly discredited, it's doubtful he'll play any conspicuous role. Feuding with U.S. Civilian Administrator L. Paul Bremer III hasn't helped his cause.

      Questions about Chalabi's role in Iraq's corrupt U.N. “oil-for-food” program. also hasn't helped his image. Chalabi flat out refused to turn over documents to confirm what, if any, role he played in skimming millions off the prestigious program. Following the first Gulf War, high-placed government officials like Chalabi skimmed millions off the program. “Even though he was at the center of the decision-making on de-Baathification, he suddenly turned on us. So there's a little bit of ‘whiplash' when it comes to Mr. Chalabi,” said an anonymous State Department official, acknowledging that Chalabi betrayed his former employer. Chalabi's bitter opposition to Baathists in Iraq's new government reflects Shiites' suspicions of U.S. intentions for Iraqi sovereignty. Like a bad double agent, Chalabi got squeezed between the Pentagon and his own lust for money and power.

      Fleecing at least three administrations, it's high time the U.S. severed ties with Ahmad Chalabi. Now that Chalabi's out of the running in Iraq's new government, he opposes U.S. sovereignty plans, including sharing power with Saddam's Baathists. While opposing Bremer didn't help matters, it's Chalabi's own history of corruption and embezzlement that should have clued in the Pentagon. Now that he's discredited, it's easy to end long-term relationships. It's disingenuous to blame Chalabi for feeding the Pentagon phony intelligence, when the Office of Special Plans exploited him to justify going to war. Like it or not, Chalabi represents a serious political liability to the White House. As Iraq's sovereignty gets closer, Chalabi just didn't fit into the White House plans. Having already gotten burned and lost millions, there's no room for more of Chalabi's shenanigans.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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