by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright May 10, 2004
All Rights Reserved.

hen White House and Pentagon lawyers decided to call Guantanamo prisoners “illegal combatants,” it was for the specific purpose of skirting the Geneva Convention. With abysmal intelligence failures causing Sept. 11, U.S. authorities created extraordinary measures—including the Patriot Act—to beef up information gathering. Treating captives as prisoners-of-war would subject interrogators to international standards, tying the hands of skillful detectives. Guantanamo's harsh conditions gave U.S. authorities new leverage with which to extract information. Without prisoner-of-war status, interrogators could apply a host of tactics otherwise unacceptable under the Geneva Convention. Following 9/11, Guantanamo was a fountain of actionable intelligence from which the CIA and FBI pursued hot leads, though interrogations also produced many dead ends.

      Fast-forwarding to Abu Ghraib prison, the same urgency prompted the Pentagon to use a no-holds-barred approach to acquiring information. With a growing insurgency killing U.S. troops, Iraqi prisoners became the best source of finding sources lethal combat. Pentagon sources couldn't decide whether escalating violence was due to Saddam loyalists, Baathist leftovers or infiltration by Al Qaeda and other foreign terrorists. Prisoner interrogations were regarded as the richest source of actionable intelligence. Viewing Abu Ghraib as analogous to Guantanamo, the Pentagon gave military intelligence the green light to “get the job done.” Two-star general and former lock-up chief at Guantanamo Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller consulted with prison personnel at Abu Ghraib last summer—though he denies recommending controversial methods documented at the notorious Baghdad jailhouse.

      Put in the context of urgent intelligence gathering, the monkey business at Abu Ghraib begins to make sense. Every big city police department seeks to break suspects and exact confessions. Heat lamps, rubber hoses, harsh treatment, phony lie detector reports, false statements from imaginary witnesses, solitary confinement, sleep and food deprivation and threats of interminable prison sentences—even death—are all designed to “soften up” or breakdown witnesses. When Miller consulted at Abu Ghraib, he brought his “hardball” expertise from 18 months at Guantanamo. “I stand by those recommendations,” said Miller, denying that methods violated the Geneva Convention or, for that matter, acceptable human rights' standards. “Those recommendations were based on a system that provided human detention, excellent interrogation, all within the bounds of the . . . Geneva Convention.”

      Miller's statements can't pass unnoticed. Guantanamo was specifically selected for its jurisdiction outside the bounds of U.S. courts. Keeping prisoners in wire cages, denying them access to lawyers, the press, International Red Cross or any other human rights organization and branding captives—regardless of national origin—“illegal combatants” was designed to give the military free reign to exact confessions and human intelligence. Following Sept. 11, no one begrudged the military the right of hard-hitting interrogations to advance national security. That's why Guantanamo—AKA camp X-Ray—operated outside U.S. courts. A lack of military training, familiarity with the Geneva Convention, poor supervision or rogue jailers had little to do with the controversial methods used at Abu Ghraib. While the White House or Pentagon scramble to call it an aberration, they know its was authorized from the top.

      Behind the window dressing and bright lights, the darkness of interrogation rooms has always been law enforcement's dirty little secret. What's printed in training manuals or codes of conduct tells a different story when it's time to break witnesses and exact confessions. Most detectives or interrogators don't permit digital photography and videotaping. Unfortunately, the dirty little secret got out at Abu Ghraib, causing catastrophic damage to the U.S. image and moral authority. A few powerful images torpedoed support for the Vietnam War: Recall a Viet Cong prisoner getting shot in the head or the Buddhist priest lighting himself on fire? Now it's a female jailer pulling a nude Iraqi prisoner by a leash or hooded prisoner wired with fake electrodes. Calling for Rumsfeld's head or promising to overhaul old policies doesn't acknowledge what happened at Abu Ghraib.

      Court-martialing lowly guards doesn't tell the whole story at Abu Ghraib. Unlike Guantanamo, the military didn't have the same anonymity to go about their business. With digital cameras flashing, the world got an ugly peak at what goes on behind the scenes. Scapegoating prison guards doesn't deal with the military culture and chain-of-command that trained and ordered jailers to employ unacceptable practices for breaking prisoners and exacting important intelligence. Prison guards shouldn't only pay the price for military intelligence failures, any more than airline passengers should suffer for incompetence at the FBI and CIA. It's unrealistic to expect jailers compensate for failed intelligence gathering. The Pentagon can't have it both ways: Call prisoners “illegal combatants” and make up new rules at Guantanamo and, at the same time, skirt the Geneva Convention at Abu Ghraib.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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