Pakistan's Big Catch

by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright May 5, 2005
All Rights Reserved.

atching another big fish, Pakistani intelligence disguised in burkas hunted down and captured al-Qaida's No. 3 man, 42-year-old Libyan-born Abu Faraj al-Libbi outside the dusty town of Mardan, 30 miles from the northwestern city of Peshwar. Pakistani officials were overjoyed capturing the terrorist responsible for at least two assassination attempts on Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. President Bush hailed the arrest, calling it “a critical victory in the war on terror,” removing “a dangerous enemy who was a direct threat to America.” Whether al-Libbi was actually involved in anything beyond havoc in Pakistan is anyone's guess. Pakistan's Information Minister Sheik Rashid Ahmed touted al-Libbi's capture as the most significant blow to al-Qaida since Khalid Shaikh Mohammed—al-Qaida's operation chief and the reputed mastermind of Sept. 11—was captured March 1, 2003.

      Al-Libbi's arrest renews hopes that authorities are hot on the trail of Osama bin Laden and his Egyptian-born doctor and No. 2 man Ayman al-Zawahiri. Pakistani officials believe al-Libbi's capture “would lead to new successes in the war against terrorism,” though stopping short of speculating whether they're any closer to getting Bin Laden. Capturing al-Libbi helps tie Iraq to the wider war on terror and makes the sacrifices seem more justified. Calling Iraq “the central front in the war on terror” doesn't change the fact that Osama bin Laden—or any of al-Qaida's chief international planners—haven't been based in Iraq. Even Iraq's most wanted terrorist—Jordanian-born terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—appears confined to running al-Qaida's operation and the insurgency in Iraq. Al-Libbi, like al-Zarqawi, may have confined his operations inside Pakistan.

      As with other arrests of key al-Qaida figures, getting al-Libbi deals another blow to Bin Laden's global terrorist network. Al-Qaida hasn't been heard from in the U.S. since Sept. 11. Al-Libbi's arrest put more heat on al-Qaida, whose global operations seem confined to joint operations with al-Zarqawi and Saddam's former Baathists inside Iraq. Though Bin Laden and Zawahiri remain at large, al-Libbi's arrest points toward indisputable success in the war on terror. It's not surprising that success comes outside Iraq, leading back to the original trail inside the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Occupying Iraq has served as a trap for al-Qaida terrorists, at least those directly connected to al-Zarqawi. It's doubtful whether getting al-Zarqawi would lead to radical Shiite Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, responsible for untold U.S. casualties and fueling the deadly insurgency.

      Capturing al-Libbi was a top priority for President Musarraf, after two unsuccessful assassination attempts. Before his capture May 4, al-Libbi did not top the CIA's most wanted list. Pakistani officials had posted a $350,000 reward last summer with al-Libbi's bearded picture under the headline, “Most Wanted Terrorists.” While the White House was quick to finger al-Libbi as al-Qaida's No. 3 man, terrorism experts were more skeptical. Pakistani intelligence regarded al-Libbi as a “regional commander,” analogous to al-Zarqawi. Yet an unnamed U.S. counter-terrorism official called al-Libbi “basically the No. 3 in al-Qaida, at the risk of grafting a Western organizational structure onto a non-Western organization,” hedging his bets of how al-Libbi fits into the hierarchy. Knowing Bin Laden in Afghanistan or the Sudan doesn't mean al-Libbi knows his whereabouts today.

      Pakistani authorities were far more cautious speculating about al-Libbi's operational role in al-Qaida. There's a big difference between a regional player and someone plotting the next terrorist attack on American soil. Hyping the significance of al-Libbi's capture demoralizes al-Qaida and its sympathizers around the globe. There's symbolic significance to landing another big fish, even when al-Libbi's precise al-Qaida role isn't known. “There may be some grade inflation going on,” said Kenneth Katzman, a senior terrorism analyst with the Congressional Research Service, hinting that the Pentagon seeks a propaganda advantage. Demoralizing the enemy with “PsyOps” or psychological operations plays an import role in war on terror. Without an established reward, Katzman doubts that al-Libbi was as big a catch as touted by the White House and Pentagon.

      Getting al-Libbi gives a big boost to President George W. Bush's war on terror. It's been two years since Pakistani authorities nabbed Khalid Shaikh Mohammed or the U.S. plucked Saddam Hussein from a spider hole near Tikrit. Landing another big fish helps Bush by linking Iraq to the global war on terror. With Bush's polls numbers sagging and skepticism on Iraq growing, capturing al-Libbi was welcomed relief. Al-Libbi played a big enough role in al-Qaida's to attempt to assassinate U.S. ally Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. He was also reportedly involved with Amjad Hussain Farrout in the abduction and beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Whether or not al-Libbi gives authorities a fresh trail to Osama bin Laden can't diminish the significance of his capture. Landing al-Libbi keeps al-Qaida on its heels before landing the next big fish.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.


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