Pakistan's Last Stand

by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright May 3, 2009
All Rights Reserved.

               Under pressure from the White House, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari made his play at an outpost near the Afghan border, killing 16 Taliban militants.  Asking for $30 billion in U.S. aid to fight Islamic militants, Zardari tried to show Obama that he’s tough on terrorism.  Only a few weeks earlier, Zardari ceded the Swat Valley to the Taliban, agreeing to implement strict Sharia law.  Zardari’s concession encouraged the Taliban to continue battling for an Islamic state.  While Taliban leadership remains incognito, it’s growing in popularity in rural areas due to the government’s failures to assure adequate infrastructure.  Zardari’s forces in the Swat valley arrested a Taliban commander Iftikhar Khan Afridi responsible for attacks and roadside bombings of NATO forces in the mountainous Kyber Pass, a key supply line between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

            U.S. authorities have grown more alarmed about the influence of radical Islamic groups in Pakistani politics.  Zardari recently surrendered territory only 60 miles from Islamabad in the Swat Valey to Taliban militants.  For years, Pakistan’s military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf turned a blind eye to militant activities along the rugged Afghan border, granting al-Qaida’s Osama bin Laden and Taliban’s Mullah Mohammed Omar safe haven.  Under Zardari’s peace deal with the Taliban, Islamic militants would be allowed protection from U.S. or Pakistani attack in exchange for accepting his national government.  U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates called the Taliban advance an “existential threat to the government of Pakistan.”  Gates viewed Zardari’s concession as surrendering to terrorists.  U.S. authorities know full well what happens when you leave criminals, like al-Qaida and the Taliban, unchecked.

            Pakistan’s government has shown reluctance to confront a militant force with growing national appeal.  Growing majorities of Pakistanis have grown more orthodox, embracing groups like the Taliban with more enthusiasm.  After years of a failed pro-Western governments and eventual Soviet control of Afghanistan, ordinary Afghans leaned toward radical religious regimes.  That was the scenario in Gaza where years of failed secular rule by the late PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat gave way to religious rule by the radical group Hamas.  Unlike Gaza, the stakes for the world are far higher in Islamabad, where the government controls an arsenal of several hundred nuclear weapons.  Speaking at a primetime press conference April 29, President Barack Obama could say with certainty whether Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was safe from a possible Taliban takeover.

            Former Pakistan military strongman Pervez Musharraf received billions in military and humanitarian aid, cutting all kinds of deals with militants. “There has been a reluctance of their part up to now.  They don’t like the idea of a significant military footprint inside Pakistan.  I understand that . . . but we are willing to do pretty much whatever we can to help the Pakistanis in the situation,” said Gates, unwilling to accept Taliban rule in the Swat Valley or ungoverned rugged border zone shared with Afghanistan. Like the situations with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, local populations have found much appeal with radicals groups like the Taliban.  Pakistani armed services have tried to reassure U.S. generals that the situation Pakistan is no longer deteriorating.   Without confronting the growing power of Pakistani militants, the Zardari government won’t last.  

            Zardari must do more than stage periodic displays to placate U.S. officials before getting re-supplied with foreign aid.  “Sixteen militants were killed in retaliatory fire.  Two security forces embraced shahadat [maryrdom]” said Pakistani military spokesman.  There was no independent confirmation from the international press, due to the extreme dangers in the region.  Pakistani forces have launched counterinsurgency operations in the hillside farming area of Buner, where the Taliban got too close to Islamabad.  Buner was outside the perimeter of the Swat Valley, where Zardari was reassured the Taliban would be confined.  While it’s not too late yet, Pakistani authorities must stop making concessions, playing games and retake areas given to militants.  Pakistani authorities are dreaming believing that the Taliban will disarm in exchange for territory:  They seek nothing less than revolution.

            Before the Obama administration turns over Pakistan’s request for $30 billion in foreign aid, he needs to see real progress in Zardari’s commitment to battle militants.  Under current circumstances U.S. aid would fall into the hands of the enemy, financing more attacks against the U.S. forces in Afghanistan.  Removing Taliban commander Iftikhar Khan Afridi from the Kyber pass should make NATO’s work a little safer but Zardari must share more intelligence and cooperate more fully with U.S. authorities.  So far, he’s played a dangerous game of fence sitting, pretending, on the one hand, to support U.S. efforts while, at the same time, making concessions to the Taliban and al-Qaida.  Before Obama turns over one nickel of foreign aid, Zardari must send his troops after Osama bin Laden and Mullah Mohammed Omar, both rumored hiding inside the Pakistani border.

  About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news.  He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.


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