by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright May 2, 2007
All Rights Reserved.

riting his own version of history, former CIA Director George J. Tenet offered his personal memoir of his seven-year tenure at the nation's premier intelligence agency. His long-awaited tome, titled “At the Center of the Storm,” leveled stinging criticism at Vice President Dick Cheney for exploiting his Dec. 12, 2002 remark, calling the CIA's case against Saddam Hussein a “slam dunk.” After resigning from the CIA June 3, 2004, Tenet seethed, listening to Cheney blame the missing WMD on Tenet's gross miscalculation of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction—the primary rationale for the Iraq war. Tenet couldn't wait to tell his story, redeeming what many view as White House complicity. After Sept. 11, the CIA's credibility plummeted, failing to stop the worst terrorist attack in the nation's history, forcing the White House and Pentagon into the intelligence business.

      Tenet and the CIA were vilified for missing the warning signs leading up Osama Bin Laden's attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Had it not been for the heroics or calamity of Flight 93, the Capitol or White House might have also gone down. “There was never a serious debate that I know of within the administration about the imminence of the Iraqi threat,” said Tenet, disputing the idea that the CIA's threat estimate prompted President George W. Bush to go to war. Tenet goes to great lengths to explain his “slam dunk” remark, disputing the idea that it referred to Saddam's stockpile of WMD. Refusing to be scapegoated, Tenet clarified that what he “really meant” was that the WMD argument was the White House's best selling point for invading Iraq. Admitting that he helped craft the administration's excuse for war casts even darker aspersions on the CIA.

      After Sept. 11, the White House and Pentagon had good cause for disappointment with the CIA. No one faults the National Security Agency for trying to come up with better intelligence after nearly 3,000 U.S. citizens lost their lives. Tenet wishes to make the case that the CIA wasn't to blame for Sept. 11 or the “bad” intelligence on WMD used by the White House to make its case for war. While Bush and Cheney still insist that the full story about the missing WMD hasn't been told, there's a growing consensus that it was based on zealots inside the White House and Pentagon. All administration officials in the run-up to war March 20, 2003, including Bush, Cheney, Secretary of State Colin A. Powell, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and all their deputies and press aides, insisted Saddam possessed dangerous stockpiles of WMD.

      Recent information about the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans under Douglas J. Feith and the Defense Intelligence Agency headed in 2002 by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, indicates that they played a crucial role in making up intelligence about Saddam's WMD. Both agencies relied heavily on spurious German intelligence about an operative codenamed “Curveball,” an Iraqi exile associated with Ahmed Chalibi, incarcerated in Bavaria, who made up stories about biologic weapons. Even after “Curveball's” cover was blown and thoroughly discredited in 2003, Cheney insisted on the presence of truck-based mobile germ factories. Tenet calls the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate highlighting Saddam's WMD “one of the lowest moments of my seven-year tenure.” Yet Tenet still rails against Cheney for using this “slam dunk” quote to divert attention away from the White House.

      History will always judge the CIA harshly under Tenet because of Sept. 11. How Al Qaeda flew under the CIA's radar is anyone's guess. There's no doubt that after Sept 11. the Pentagon felt it had to pick up the slack on intelligence gathering, opening the door to manipulation by the White House and Pentagon. Tenet wanted no part of the White House use of an uncorroborated report in 2002 about Saddam trying to buy “yellocake” enriched uranium from Niger that appeared in Bush's 2003 State of the Union speech. Nor would Tenet support a planned 2002 speech by Cheney trying to connect Saddam with Al Qaeda. “Mr. President, we cannot support the speech and it should not be given,” Tenet told Bush, stopping Cheney's speech. Within the last month, Cheney told nationally syndicated radio host Rush Limbaugh that an Iraqi agent met in Prague before Sept. 11 with Al Qaeda.

      Tenet's new book paints the former CIA director as a victim of a White House PR hatchet job. After disputing the Niger claim, Tenet claims his stock at the White House deteriorated leading to his resignation June 3, 2004. Tenet's own admission about the reasons for his “slam dunk” comment, namely, to help sell Bush's March 20, 2003 Iraq invasion, proves the CIA collusion in selling the war. “I told the president that strengthening the public presentation was a ‘slam dunk,' a phrase that was later taken out of context,” said Tenet, admitting he helped sell the administration's case for war. “If I had simply said, ‘I'm sure we can do better,' I wouldn't be writing this chapter—or maybe even this book,” exposing the real motive for his memoir: To clear his name. Tenet played Cheney's game and eventually got burned. Now he wants to change history and undo the damage.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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