by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright April 11, 2008
All Rights Reserved.

hen Gen. David Petraeus testified April 9 before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, no one expected revelations about the Iraq. While he asked for a moratorium on troop reductions, he also pointed to the bizarre relationship among Nouri al-Maliki's U.S.-backed government, radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, and, yes, Iran's U.S.-bashing Islamic government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While GOP nominee Sen. John McCain blasted Democratic candidates Sen. Barack Obama (D-Il.) and Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.) for urging an orderly withdrawal strategy, he ignored the danger of Shiite militias. McCain warned only about an al-Qaida takeover should U.S. forces retreat. Al-Qaida is the terrorist network associated with Osama bin Laden, responsible for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trader Center and Pentagon.

      Neither President George W. Bush nor his Defense Secretary Robert Gates explains the sudden shift from al-Qaida to Shiite militias. Bush and GOP nominee John McCain insisted that a precipitous U.S. pullout would hand al-Qaida a victory and leave Iraq vulnerable to a takeover by Islamic extremists. U.S. rationale for continuing the loss of U.S. lives and $12-16 billion month hemorrhage to the federal treasury involved preventing an al-Qaida takeover. Bush and McCain insist that Iraq is the “central front in the war on terror,” battling the perpetrators of Sept. 11. No reliable terrorism expert or shred of evidence supports the idea that fighting in Iraq keeps terrorists off American streets. White House officials frequently point to the lack of terrorist attacks on U.S soil as proof of a successful anti-terror program. No one really knows why the U.S. hasn't been hit again.

      Some Mideast terror experts believe that Iran is fighting a proxy war in Iraq, supplying arms and logistics to Shiite militias, especially Moqtada al-Sadr's 10,000-man-strong al-Mahdi militia. When Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was threatened by Al-Qaida and Sunni insurgents and his security services and military couldn't defend him, he relied heavily on al-Sadr. Sen. Barack Obama (D-Il.) and Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) pointed to al-Maliki's cozy relationship with Iran's radical President Mahmoud Ahmadined, whose al-Quds revolutionary guards routinely arm Shiite militias to fight U.S. occupation. Ahmadinejad provides al-Sadr safe haven in Iran, while al-Quds brigades arms al-Sadr and the Badr brigades, headed by Ayatollah Mohamad Baqir al-Hakim. Both al-Sadr and al-Hakim vehemently oppose and resist al-Maliki regime and U.S. occupation.

      Gates talks about the dangers of Shiite militias, not, since taking over for former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld Dec. 18, 2006, al-Qaida, whose terrorism added to Iraq's sectarian strife. Before the end of 2007, Gates hoped to reduce Iraq troop-strength to 100,000. With the latest spike in Shiite violence, Gates and Petraeus now call for a halt to troop reductions, fearing a takeover by al-Sadr. When al-Maliki's troops refused to fight al-Sadr's army in Basra March 28, it signaled infiltration by al-Sadr into al-Maliki's army. “I think the Iraqi government now has a clear view of the malignant impact of Iran's activities inside Iraq,” said Gates, ignoring al-Sadr's stand-down of Iraqi forces in Basra. Al-Maliki's retreat in Basra signaled that al-Sadr's al-Mahdi army offered more loyalty to terrorists fighting U.S. occupation than the sovereign Iraqi government.

      Al-Maliki's inability to rein-in Shiite militias represents a disturbing development in Iraq. Al-Qaida no longer poses the biggest long-range threat to Iraq's sovereignty. Gates was thrown for a loop when al-Maliki's army backed down confronting al-Sadr in Basra. “I think they have had what I would call a growing understanding of that negative Iranian role. But I think what they encountered in Basra was a real eye-opener for them,” said Gates, realizing that the real problem, as it has been for years, infiltration by al-Sadr into al-Maliki's military. Sabber-rattling at Iran or new attempts to blame the Persian nation for arming Iraq's insurgency doesn't deal with the fact that al-Sadr enjoys widespread popularity among the Iraqi people. No matter what role Iran plays in Iraq's civil war, it can't deny al-Sadr's infiltration into the Iraq's military, refusing to fight fellow Shiites.

      No amount of military might can change that hearts-and-minds of the Iraqi people seeking national leadership. When Prime Minister al-Maliki threatened to wipe out al-Sadr, the White House clapped, until realizing that Iraq's army wouldn't fight their friends and relatives. Unlike al-Maliki that's seen as a puppet regime, al-Sadr enjoys the popular support of rank-and-file Shiites, accounting for nearly 70% of the Iraqi population. “It is a movement that must be addressed and, to varying degrees, accommodated, ” said Petraeus, doubting whether the U.S. military could or should take out al-Sadr. Basra's standoff revealed the central flaw to the U.S. mission in Iraq: The U.S. backs an unpopular regime whose military is infiltrated by elements sympathetic to al-Sadr and other Shiite groups supported by Iran. Neither the U.S. nor Al-Maliki can change that fact.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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