by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright April 1, 1999
All Rights Reserved.

e’re Right, They’re Wrong," the apt but conspicuously narcissistic title of James Carville’s moribund book chronicling the fiction of the 'vast right wing conspiracy,’ might very well characterize the utter simplicity and cosmetics of the U.S. policy in Serbia. Like most moving targets, shifting positions of the State Department raise serious concerns about what former senator and presidential candidate Bob Dole admonished as an "ad hoc" foreign policy.

       'Ad hoc' might prove euphemistic when you consider the State Department’s amnesia about the Serb’s role in the Balkans during World War II. Resisting Nazi occupation with all their might, they were the only Balkan country to drive the Germans out of their borders. Recalling this tenacity should have alerted the Defense Department that Milosevic wasn’t bluffing when he refused to sign the lopsided U.S.-sponsored peace accord ‘negotiated’ in Rambouillet, France — despite all the threats and saber-rattling. While NATO made good on their promise to start bombing, a cursory study of European history would have given some insight into its outcome.

       One day we’re stabilizing Western Europe and next day we’re trying to get Milosevic to sign an aborted peace treaty. On another day, we’re drawing the line against ‘genocide’ — but only in Kosovo. Sometimes it’s all of the above and at other times it’s none of the above. Guess what? It’s whatever the White House ‘communication’ office [AKA spin machine] decides the press and public will swallow. As it was before the bombing began, the mission today is just as obscured. Continued losses and causalities are infecting the resolve of a susceptible NATO coalition, already showing signs of cracks. Revising strategy, in the absence of success, isn’t a bad thing. Wreaking more suffering, chaos and anarchy on the streams of ethnic Albanians displaced and fleeing for their lives is hardly aiding their cause.

       Now, because of the diplomatic failures at Rambouillet and because NATO’s blitzkrieg is making matters far worse for the Kosovars, the U.S. has boxed itself into a lonely corner. Either continue a wasteful, costly and, yes, ineffectual air campaign in the improbable hope that Milosevic will finally fold OR recant on the administration’s declared position of not sending in ground troops. Either option appears more and more unappealing, and, more realistically, dicey with the chances of success. Like Iraq, the U.S.’s only claim to victory is that we’ve ‘degraded’ Belgrade’s war machine. Have we really? Roving bands of Serbian forces are still pillaging and plundering the Kosovo countryside. Many have rightfully questioned how it’s possible for a 'surgical' air campaign to stop what’s happening on the ground.

       As for the President’s critics who cite his rebellious positions on Vietnam war, they’re pining the tail on the wrong donkey. There’s certainly plenty to criticize with the administration’s current handling of foreign affairs, especially Iraq and Serbia. It’s not necessary to hark back to Clinton’s ancient views on a tragic war in which he evaded service. Committing troops — in the air, sea or land — in Iraq or Serbia isn’t proof of Clinton’s hypocrisy but rather his unmistakable miscalculations and failures on the diplomatic front. Walking clumsily and bending some big arms is no substitute for patient, evenhanded and skillful negotiations.

       Recognizing the abhorrence of 'ethnic cleansing' is no excuse to force a sovereign nation to cede its territory. Brokering peace deals is no easy matter and it’s especially difficult when the U.S. takes unambiguous sides, and then expects both parties to sign an agreement in which one party makes unilateral concessions. Expecting Milosevic to sign a deal which amounts to surrendering a 'sacred' province is both unrealistic and audacious. Without ignoring or excusing Belgrade’s 'scorched earth' policy, it still doesn’t tell both sides of the story. While it’s true that Belgrade crossed the line with excessive violence, it’s also true that the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA] has butchered Serbians during their 10 year quest for liberation. Telling one side of the story, taking sides, and pressuring one party to sign on the dotted line, doesn’t inspire confidence or respect.

       It’s helpful to remember that, following World War I, Serbia extended a safe haven in Kosovo to Albanians seeking refuge from a brutal dictator ruling Albania. Though Communist Yugolavia under Tito recognized the autonomy of Kosovo, they didn’t permit Kosovo to become a breakaway republic. Now that Serbia recognizes Kosovo as the 'cradle' of their civilization, it’s even more difficult to imagine Serbia abandoning its 'sacred' province. Considering these facts and the results of NATO’s ongoing mission, it’s time to recalculate strategy, make the necessary adjustments and, perhaps with the help of the U.N., begin the painful process of hammering out a more satisfactory diplomatic solution.

       Despite the 'booming' economy, squandering U.S. military assets and placing American troops in harm’s way should be methodically evaluated before leaping into adventures in which no clear objectives are in sight. As many have warned, war is a dirty game, and it’s just a matter of time before some mishap drags us into a wider escalation. Now that we know that Milocevic hasn’t folded, the U.S. and NATO must admit that the initial strategy hasn’t worked. It’s time to stop the spinning and return to the drawing board before it’s too late.

About the Author

John M. Curtis is director of a West Los Angeles think tank specializing in human behavior, health care and political research and media consultation. He’s a seminar trainer, columnist and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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