by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright March 26, 2003
All Rights Reserved.

aging a fierce propaganda battle, the Pentagon finds itself squeezed between dangerous circumstances on the battlefield and ominous riptides in public opinion. After a long weekend, Wall Street abruptly lost its war euphoria, watching the DOW plummet more than 300 points, signaling, if nothing else, that expectations of an easy victory rapidly unraveled. "The military is making good progress in Iraq, yet this war is far from over," said President Bush, ringing a sobering note at Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. Following the stock market, the public's favorable image about the war's progress dropped from 71% to 38%, as measured by the latest CNN-USA Today poll. As progress slows and casualties mount, public opinion mirrors ongoing press reports now questioning Pentagon strategy, especially the record sprint toward Baghdad without securing supply-lines or containing enemy positions.

      Bush's recent remarks attempt to mute the Pentagon's over-zealousness, fueling wild expectations about popular uprisings, mass defections, imminent surrenders, decapitated leadership and, yes, instant victory. Psychological warfare sometimes boomerangs when artful propaganda goes awry, exposing gross exaggerations that don't match press accounts. Early on, Secretary of State Donald H. Rumsfeld spoke confidently about glaring cracks in Iraqi leadership, speculating about Saddam's injuries or even death from the first salvos. Advertising "shock and awe" also raised high hopes that American firepower would rapidly topple Saddam's regime. Sweeping into the Iraqi desert west of the Euphrates and heading virtually unopposed northbound toward Baghdad gave the impression that the U.S. faced little resistance, when fierce barriers weren't expected until an Najaf and Karbala.

      Unlike the first Gulf War, Pentagon planners believed that overwhelming force wasn't needed this time around. With the 4th Infantry—including its 200 M1A1 Abrams tanks, 200 Bradley fighting vehicles, 50 M109A6 Paladin self propelled artillery pieces, 18 Apache Long-bow helicopters and 450 support vehicles—diverted from Turkey and moving slowly through the Suez canal, the military lacks the beef needed to steamroll Saddam's layers of Republican Guard. "It would have been monumentally helpful for CentCom to have had that division," said retired Lt. Gen. Thomas G. Rhame on Tuesday, raising questions about Rumsfeld's streamlined strategy. Gen. Wesley K. Clark—now CNN's lead military analyst—former supreme allied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and former commander in chief of the U.S. European Command, worried about the delay in rerouting the 4th Infantry.

      Dampening hopes for an easy victory, the Pentagon is now trying to undo public relations damage as troops face the daunting task of taking Baghdad. Dialogue has now shifted away from easy surrender to the upcoming confrontation with the Republican Guard. Highlighting enemy casualties and coalition victories helps to contain growing concerns that coalition forces face a far different scenario than 1991. Inclement weather goes with the territory and won't ultimately decide the outcome, though blistering heat could stall ground operations should fighting drag into the summer. Blinding sandstorms haven't helped the Army's 3rd Infantry Division, slogging its way toward Baghdad, awaiting the eventual arrival of the Army's massive 4th Infantry Division. "The army is feeling hamstrung," said Clark, by the Secretary of Defense, whose new leaner army might not fit the mammoth task of taking Baghdad.

      War propaganda needs to prepare the psychological battlefield not by exaggerating successes or raising fantasies about easy victories but by methodically cultivating realistic expectations. Unlike Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom involves dismantling Saddam's entire regime, not dislodging his army from foreign soil. Hyping expectations about mass defections, wholesale surrenders or battlefield victories creates unwanted letdowns, when dramatic progress isn't at hand. "Day by day, Saddam Hussein is losing his grip on Iraq. Day by day, the Iraqi people are closer to freedom," said Bush, reminding an impatient press that progress will be measured in small steps. When the Pentagon boasts about breaking records or high-tech equipment, it sends hopes soaring, leading to unwanted disappointments. Contending with rapid swings in momentum and public opinion shows good public relations.

      Pentagon officials must cut the bravado, play down battlefield successes and, for the most part, stop whining about the enemy's dirty tactics. Boasting about coalition victories sets up criticism when troops endure unavoidable casualties and setbacks. There's a fine line between tactical disinformation and chest thumping that invites unwanted disappointments and criticism. Taking the psychological offense involves deliberately underplaying strengths, lulling the enemy into overconfidence and a false sense of security. Winning the psychological war involves more than persuading the enemy that their situation is hopeless and to give up. When the enemy won't take the bait or respond to psychological warfare, it's better to downplay advantages and acknowledge weakness. Winning the propaganda battle is more than blowing smoke: It's about sticking to a plan until the enemy falls on his face.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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