Obama's Afghan Pivot
by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700
Copyright
March 22, 2009
All Rights Reserved.
Signaling a shift in U.S. Afghan policy, President
Barack Obama hinted that he would not make the same mistake as former President
George W. Bush: Giving the war a blank
check. Following Sept. 11, the Bush
administration toppled the Taliban government Nov. 13, 2001, driving its
one-eyed leader Mullah Mohammed Omar into hiding. Accused of supporting Osama bin Laden, the Taliban operates a network of skilled Pashtun
fighters known for their successful decade-long battle with the Soviet Union
during the of the 1980s. When the Taliban finally evicted the Soviets Feb. 15, 1989, Omar had a close alliance
with Saudi-born Osama Bin Laden, both joining forces to defeat Soviet
occupation. When the U.S. evicted
the Taliban in 2001, they joined a strategic alliance with al-Qaida, seeking
nothing short of returning Afghanistan to strict Islamic law known a “Sharia.”
Obama campaigned on the promise he would find an exit strategy in Iraq,
shifting U.S. forces to the real war on terror.
Obama rejected Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney’s belief that Iraq was
the central front in the war on terror.
Beginning to scale back forces in Iraq, Barack promised to add more
forces to a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. Starting in June, U.S. troops are
expected to rise by 30,000, signaling a shift in U.S. priorities. “What we can’t do is think that just
a military approach in Afghanistan is going to be able to solve our problems,”
Barack told CBS broadcast journalist Scott Pelley in an exclusive interview on
“60 Minutes.” Barack made a
convincing case during the campaign that the U.S. barked up the wrong tree in
Iraq. He suggested under his
leadership that the U.S. would shift emphasis overseas from Iraq to Afghanistan.
Barack expressed reservations about Iraq from the get-go but vaguely
supported efforts in Afghanistan to pursue the perpetrators of Sept. 11, namely,
Osama bin Laden, believed hiding in the rugged ungoverned tribal region shared
with Pakistan. Since the Jan. 2007 Iraq troop-surge, violence has been
substantially reduced. Casualties
in Afghanistan, on the other hand, have dramatically jumped, prompting the
recent increase in U.S. troops.
While many believe Iraq was the wrong war, they also don’t want to fall victim
to black-or-white logic that Afghanistan is the right one. Barack’s recent misgivings about
Afghanistan reflect military appraisals that the situation—as the Soviets found
out—is bleak and unwinnable.
Neither the U.S. military nor NATO can strike a political solution or create the
kind of centralized government needed to control the vast regions of the
country.
Escalating U.S. forces won’t change the fact that the government of Hamid
Karzai controls only a small portion of Kabul and has virtually no control in
the rest of the country. Opium
farmers—by far the most powerful faction in Afghanistan—supported by well-armed
militias control much of the country, providing financial and military support
to the Taliban. “So what we’re
looking for is a comprehensive strategy.
And there’s got to be an exit strategy . . . There’s got to be a sense
that this is not a perpetual drift,” said Barack, hinting that, despite the
recent troop build-up, that there’s no victory in sight. Given tough economic times, Barack
realizes that without substantial military savings it’s going to be difficult to
fund national health care, global warming, alternative fuels, education and
major infrastructure rebuilding.
Savings must come from somewhere:
Why not the military?
Afghan president Hamid Karzai is one bullet away from revolution. While U.S. and NATO troops have kept
a lid on Islamic extremists, the Taliban movement continues to press ahead with
its theocratic agenda. When they
blew up several-stories-tall 5th century Buddhist rock carvings, they exhibited
the kind of fanaticism needed for successful mass movements. No U.S. or NATO force can dictate
the kind of government needed for stability and prosperity. If rank-and-file Afghans want an Islamic theocracy, there’s little the U.S. can do change
that. When Gazans went to the polls
Jan. 28, 2005 and voted for Hamas, there was little the U.S. could do to change
their minds. Afghanistan, too, could easily choose the Taliban over Karzai’s government, signaling
that U.S. military involvement could prove fruitless. Spending more blood-and-treasure in
Afghanistan assures nothing.
Obama must recalculate the prevailing wisdom that Afghanistan is the
“real” war on terror. There’s no
evidence that supporting today’s Taliban is a vote for Osama bin Laden. Sending more troops and pouring
billions into Afghanistan won’t change opinion polls showing more support for
the renegade Taliban than Karazai’s “Democratic” government. Before Barack jumps in with both
feet, he needs tSending more troops and pouring
billions into Afghanistan won’t change opinion polls showing more support for
the renegade Taliban than Karzai’s “Democratic” government. Before Barack jumps in with both
feet, he needs to take a serious inventory of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Vice President Dick Cheney recently
opined that the U.S. was less safe than when he and Bush were at the helm. He believes exiting Iraq, shuttering
Guantanamo, banning “enhanced interrogation techniques” and ending warrantless
wiretapping makes the U.S. less safe.
Cheney has no problem escalating Afghanistan War. Given today’s budget constraints,
Obama must seriously reconsider escalating the Afghan war.
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