by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright March 22, 2003
All Rights Reserved.

coring what appears as early-round victories in southern Iraq, President Bush warned that the war could be "longer and more difficult," cautioning hoards of Monday morning quarterbacks busy predicting an easy knockout. While troops have meet little resistance so far, Iraq's elite Republican Guard forces are dug-in around Iraq's two largest cities of Baghdad and Basra. Jumping the gun, it's easy to get seduced into Saddam's rope-a-dope because he surrendered the southern-most village of Safwan, where the first Persian Gulf armistice was signed in 1991, or the port Umm al Qasr, Iraq's only outlet on the gulf. Signaling the coalition forces aren't yet ready for messy combat, troops stopped short of Basra, making no attempt to penetrate Iraq's highly fortified Mecca of oil wealth. While Iraq's 51st Mechanized Division apparently surrendered, its tattered troops looked hungry and ill-equipped.

      With propaganda in full swing, it's difficult to separate psychological warfare from facts on the battlefield, including specific types of resistance met by U.S. troops. Diverting convoys to the open desert west of Euphrates River gives the impression of unimpeded access but doesn't yet test forces in head-to-head combat. Pentagon planners have done a masterful job of preparing the psychological battlefield, but troops haven't met stiff opposition. Dropping leaflets or broadcasting propaganda probably won't unnerve Saddam's most loyal troops—at least not yet. Cruise missiles and smart-bombs send a more convincing message to Iraq's hierarchy. "If you're asking, is there contact between coalition forces and Iraqi forces, the answer is most certainly," said Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, giving the impression that high-level talks were underway to bring about widespread defections or even surrender.

      Leading up to hostilities, Saddam redeployed his troops from remote areas to key locations around Iraq's major cities. Digging trenches around Baghdad, he plans to draw coalition forces into protracted urban warfare, inflicting maximum casualties, turning world opinion against the U.S. and softening America's resolve. No one expected resistance in southern outposts or outlying desert paths leading to key Iraqi cities. Saddam hopes to duplicate the nightmare in Somalia, where U.S. forces were ambushed by clever guerrillas, sustained intolerable losses and eventually called it quits. "This will not be a campaign of half-measures," said Bush in his weekly radio address, reassuring doubters that he will use "decisive force" to prevail. Bush cautioned against overconfidence, concerned that the press was setting the public up for disappointment, should the fighting take longer than current media predictions.

      Controversy persists over whether Saddam, his sons, or key members of his inner circle were killed or injured during the initial Cruise Missile strike on a leadership bunker in Baghdad. "We continue to believe they were in the compound," said an unnamed White House official. "There's conflicting reports about whether they were killed or injured," attesting to the swirling speculation about Saddam's fate. While the Pentagon claims Saddam is "losing control," it's premature to say whether he has really lost his grip. "The regime is starting to lose control," said, Rumsfeld, telegraphing to Iraqi leadership that their situation is hopeless. Military units in outlying areas don't reflect Saddam's strategy of fortifying defenses in key urban areas. Before Baghdad falls, it's difficult to tell how fast Saddam will hit the canvas. Holding back on "shock and awe," the Pentagon hopes to coax an early surrender and avoid unnecessary bloodshed.

      Saddam's plan includes feigning chaos until U.S. troops face an unspeakable ambush when they penetrate Baghdad, Basra and other key Iraqi cities. No matter what the eventual outcome, Saddam won't go down without dragging his troops with him. Sealing off Baghdad, he intends not only to annihilate coalition troops but the mass murder of his own forces. Diagnosed by the CIA as a "malignant narcissist," Iraq is inseparable from his megalomania, leading him to take down his entire country. Rumsfeld is right on the money encouraging his loyalists to take him out before he trashes Iraq. When U.S. troops face Saddam's deathtrap in Baghdad, the Pentagon will have to do much more than "shock and awe." Before U.S. troops march into Baghdad, the battlefield will need far more preparation, including densely packed areas using the civilian population as human shields.

      Cunning, seductive and beguiling, Saddam hopes to trick coalition forces into his deathtrap in Baghdad. Saddam proved in the last Gulf War that he can take a punch. As the rounds progress, the Pentagon must stop pulling punches, hoping to coax an early surrender or avoid condemnation in the court of public opinion. Rather than going for the quick knockout, the Pentagon must pace itself and urge the press to temper expectations about an instant victory. "A campaign on harsh terrain in a vast country could be longer and more difficult than some have predicted," said President Bush, bringing down current euphoria to more realistic levels. Saddam wants a quick ground confrontation in Baghdad, rather than face relentless pounding from U.S. air superiority. To avoid Saddam's Jonestown, the Pentagon must corral early enthusiasm, contain unrealistic expectations and stick to its game plan.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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