by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright March 15, 1999
All Rights Reserved.

roving that he’s a quick study, a defiant Slobodan Milosevic has learned his lessons well from another deranged tyrant living between the Tigress and Euphrates. Yes, Saddam Hussein blazed the trail for frustrating Goliath by taking the allies’ best shot and staying on his feet. Whatever controversy exists over bomb damage assessment (BDA) in Iraq, the fact remains that Saddam no longer has UNSCOM weapons’ inspectors on Iraqi soil. Like Iraq, what’s the ‘end-game’ once NATO’s bombing campaign against Belgrade finally ends? And it will end. A hint: "We do not invite any foreign troops to our territory, nor shall we be inviting them in the future, because we are a sovereign country," remarked Yugoslav foreign minister Zivadin Jovanovic, in response to NATO’s ultimatum.

       Regardless of the so-called abortive diplomatic efforts in Rambouillet, France, NATO saber-rattling and bombing also isn’t a quick fix. Centuries-old ethnic hatreds aren’t reconciled by allied military intervention. Nor, for that matter, can we expect a pinprick bombing campaign to topple the Milosevic regime. While it’s ‘politically correct’ to attack the recalcitrant despot today, how much ‘moral authority’ will exist if allied forces sustain serious casualties? It’s reasonable to ask: What’s the mission? Degrade Belgrade’s military capability to wage war against ethnic Albanians? Or, to use the military gambit to get Milocevic to sign on the dotted line?

       While launching satellite-guided Tomahawk cruise missiles and dropping laser-guided bombs may help Belgrade get the message, it might also make matters worse. If the bombing campaign fails to bring Milocevic back to the table, then what’s going to be the plight of the streams of refugees already victims of Serbian persecution? Like Bosnia-Herzegovina, there’s little hope without a substantial and enduring peacekeeping force. At this point, getting peacekeepers invited to Kosovo seems highly unlikely. Without an allied presence on the ground in Kosovo, the prospects for any short or long-term solution to the genocide seem dismal.

       Bending arms and brokering one-sided peace deals — with or without the help of the U.N. — makes good publicity, but usually doesn’t work. Beyond the smoke, how much do the European Community really care about the plight of Kosovo and the ethnic Albanians? Even senator John McCain (Rep. Ariz.) voiced such concerns during the last round of gunboat diplomacy when he questioned the EC’s commitment to containing Serbian aggression. If they don’t care, why should we?

       "Serbia’s mounting aggression must be stopped," declared president Clinton, making his best case for U.S. participation in a NATO bombing campaign against the Belgrade regime. Six months ago, when Amnesty International confirmed reports of bodies oozing from shallow, mass graves, the administration turned a blind eye to reports of Serbian genocide. Making what appears as an about-face, the U.S. is now arguing that Serbian aggression threatens Western security and its European neighbors. Sound familiar? One day prior to the House ethic committee’s historic vote on impeachment, the same argument was made about Saddam Hussein. Neither case represents an imminent danger to its neighbors or the West.

       Saddam never really wanted U.N. inspectors trespassing on his ‘sovereignty’ and neither does Slobodan. Regrettably for the EC, Belgrade — unlike Baghdad — is too close for comfort. Most military affairs analysts find the risk of a spreading conflagration about the same as medical marijuana use leading to dangerous drugs. As atrocious as Belgrade’s policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is to the civilized world, concerns about Yugoslav’s civil war spreading beyond its borders are greatly exaggerated. The case for NATO’s military intervention is more than justified by Belgrade’s egregious crimes against humanity.

       With all the hype about defying U.N. inspection efforts and preempting Iraq from developing its illicit weapons’ programs, what has the last series of laser-guided bombs and cruise missile attacks accomplished? While Iraq’s more insulated than ever and busy rearming, where are U.N. inspectors now? Unlike his last stare-down with the West back in October, Slobodan is now apparently ready to follow Hussein’s lead and allow NATO to begin what some experts believe is a costly and wasteful attempt to force his signature on an aborted peace accord.

       No one — other than what’s left of the Iron Curtain — believes that Belgrade is entitled to its aggression and ethnic purges. But waging war on Serbia only from the air might yield, as it has in Iraq, some dicey results. Expecting NATO to only target military installations is a tall order to fill, especially when renegade Serbian battalions continue to pillage and plunder the Kosovo countryside. While NATO has its mission, the U.S. must also recalculate its objectives in the region. If ending the bloodshed and genocide is truly the concern, then the case must be made for how U.S. foreign policy can no longer stand idly by while innocent civilians are mowed down with impunity. Simply joining NATO’s effort to force Belgrade to sign a peace treaty won’t solve the Yugoslav civil war or age-old ethnic hatreds. Stopping genocide — by whatever means — is where the U.S. must draw the line.

About the Author

John M. Curtis is director of a West Los Angeles think tank specializing in human behavior, health care and political research and media consultation. He’s a seminar trainer, columnist and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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