by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright March 15, 2001
All Rights Reserved.

howboating, taking undue risks and pushing the pedal to the metal, Cmdr. Scott D. Waddle needs to stop blowing smoke and accept responsibility for causing the latest maritime disaster. Dazzling VIPs with a risky “emergency blow” drill, the U.S. nuclear submarine Greenville blasted through the hull of the 191-foot Japanese fishing trawler Ehime Maru on February 9, sending the 500 ton training vessel plunging—with 9 of its crew—to a watery grave, just 9 miles off picturesque Diamond Head. “Jesus, what the hell was that?” reacted sub Cmdr. Scott D. Waddle, according to John Hall, a civilian at the controls, instructed to pull two levers responsible for rocketing the 6500-ton submarine to the surface. “Just as it was starting to come down and you could feel the sensation of coming down, there was a very loud noise and the entire submarine shuddered,” recalled Hall, insisting that the crew and captain performed with “clock-like” precision, despite colliding with the Japanese fishing boat. “Everybody was in shock,” recalled Hall, as he and the other VIPs were whisked to the mess hall where they watched the horrific disaster from a monitor, observing the sinking Ehime Maru’s crew and passengers swimming for their lives in murky diesel fuel.

       After colliding with the trawler, Cmdr. Waddle told Time Magazine in the March 12 edition: “I was dumbstruck. I had no idea any other vessel was in the area . . . It was as if something died inside me.” But, in fact, Waddle knew from earlier sonar reports that the Japanese fishing boat was sighted in the area. Beyond that, giving the green light for the “emergency blow,” Waddle was clearly responsible for having access to all information needed to safely execute the risky maneuver. Pretending otherwise overlooks earlier reports of Petty Officer Patrick Thomas Seacrest, who manned the sonar station during the Greenville’s exercises. While it’s easy to flog subordinates, the buck must stop with the skipper. Acting clueless and pretending that Cmdr. Waddle went by the book [Navy Warfare Publication] when he ordered the nuclear powered Greenville to surface—without carefully reviewing sonar data—sinking the Ehime Maru, flies in the face of common sense. You can be sure that Navy Warfare Publication makes no provision for grandstanding on nuclear submarines with VIP passengers.

       At the Navy’s Board of Inquiry hearing, Waddle’s attorney Charles Gittin wasted no time discounting Waddle’s culpability, spreading the blame around. Blaming crowded conditions in the control room, inadequate sonar data and heavy seas, Gittin passed the buck to Waddle’s subordinates—especially Petty Officer Seacrest, responsible for supplying up-to-the-minute sonar data. “If the officer of the deck and the commanding officer had received that [sonar] information . . . could they have taken actions in order to avoid a collision with the Japanese vessel?” asked Lt. Cmdr. Brent Filbert to Rear Adm. Charles H. Griffiths Jr., who headed the Navy’s preliminary investigation. “Most emphatically, yes,” replied Griffith, “It was a key piece of information that they were not provided.” And here lies the absurd fallacy: Without complete sonar information, Cmdr. Waddle should have never undertaken his risky “emergency blow” procedure. Painting the captain as a hapless bystander totally ignores Waddle’s role in choreographing the thrilling ride. With or without the vital data, the commanding officer weighed the risks—for better or worse—and made his decision. Court-marshalling Petty Officer Seacrest doesn’t erase Waddle’s ill-advised move.

       Drawing twisted parallels to the terrorist suicide bombing of the destroyer Cole stretches credulity to the breaking point, suggesting that the captain simply followed the book and was a victim of unforeseen circumstances. When Cmdr. Waddle pressed ahead with the “emergency blow” he—and he alone—took the responsibility for the safety of his crew, passengers, and, yes, the 2-billion dollar submarine. What does getting run-of-the-mill sonar data have to do with predicting terrorist attacks? No one in the chain of command follows normal procedures by ascertaining the chance of terrorism. But submarines—and other navy vessels for that matter—must use all available electronic means to illuminate their essentially blind environment, including radar, sonar, and, yes, the old periscope. Now we get to another missed opportunity. Spending only 80 seconds sweeping the area with his periscope, Cmdr. Waddle deviated from the standard procedure of at least 180 seconds. Impeccable credentials or not, Cmdr. Waddle badly miscalculated the risks, failed to review key pieces of data, and departed from normal procedures.

       Testifying before Court of Inquiry, Greenville navigator Lt. Keith Sloan revealed that Cmdr. Waddle seemed under pressure moments before the fatal accident. “He was definitely going quickly; he wasn’t wasting time,” said Sloan, suggesting that Waddle took unwise shortcuts prior to his decision to dive the submarine to a depth of 800 feet and then execute an “emergency blow,” launching the submarine to the surface. Sloan indicated that Cmdr. Waddle ignored officer of the deck, Lt. j.g. Michael Coen, bypassing his opinion as to whether the Greenville was safe to engage in the risky procedure. Sloan also indicated that not enough attention was paid to sonar, radar readings, and, of course, periscope sweeps. “I had expressed concern with the captain over this,” admitted Sloan, “He [Waddle] basically told me he was happy the way he was doing it.” While not conclusive, Sloan’s testimony paints a different picture than Waddle’s attorney who suggests that the commanding officer wasn’t afforded key data.

       Showing off and hotdogging with 2-billion dollar nuclear submarines has no place in giving VIPs “the thrill of a lifetime.” Caught up in the hoopla, Cmdr. Waddle allowed his machismo to eclipse his best judgment endangering his crew, civilians, and, yes, a costly piece of military hardware. While accidents do happen, this one could have been easily avoided had Cmdr. Waddle showed better control of his ego and followed standard operating procedures. No matter how you spin it, Cmdr. Waddle was responsible for reviewing all pertinent data and following Navy guidelines before indulging his need to impress VIP guests. There’s no excuse for crashing into a 190-foot vessel other than Cmdr. Waddle’s blinding recklessness, driving the 6500-ton nuclear submarine like a Porsche and losing control. Whether he’s too macho to rely on his younger crew is anyone’s guess. Suggesting that this accident was beyond his control denies his role in causing the mishap. Equating this incident to an unpredictable terrorist attack pushes logic over the top—something you don’t want from captains of nuclear submarines.

About the Author

John M. Curtis is editor of OnlineColumnist.com and columnist for the Los Angeles Daily Journal. He’s director of a Los Angeles think tank specializing in political consulting and strategic public relations. He’s the author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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