by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright March 10, 2003
All Rights Reserved.

n the eve of war with Iraq, the White House faces daunting challenges from North Korea's nuclear ambitions, now defying the International Atomic Energy Agency, booting out inspectors and activating its Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant. But lurking around the corner is Tehran's cryptic nuclear program getting dangerously close to producing enough fissile material to build atomic bombs. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said there is "clear evidence" that Tehran is trying to enrich enough uranium to build several A-bombs, despite monitoring from the IAEA. IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei's declaration that "there's no evidence of Iraq's uranium enrichment program" doesn't inspire much confidence, knowing Tehran flew under the U.N.'s radar. Making his case for disarming Saddam, Powell pointed out that rogue states have little difficulty concealing proscribed weapons programs.

      When Israel bombed Iraq's Osirag atomic reactor June 19, 1981, U.S. intelligence became acutely aware of Saddam's nuclear obsession. Even former non-proliferation hawk and Nobel lauraeate ex-President Jimmy Carter sternly warned in 1981 about terrorists and rogue states getting their hands on nuclear weapons. Had Saddam held a nuclear device during the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. would have faced a far different scenario. Contemplating the unthinkable, Sept. 11 would have been more catastrophic had Bin Laden possessed an A-bomb. Pakistan's infamous bomb maker Abdul Qadeer Khan, whose know-how gave Iran and North Korea the technology for enriching uranium, believes all third world countries deserve nuclear bombs. After all, it was Pakistan's A-bomb that gave it parity with India, after years of military inferiority. Pakistan now flexes it nuclear muscles and India backs down.

      With the Gulf War II sequel getting closer, the Pentagon agonizes over various nightmares, including Saddam unleashing his deadly arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. Only a thimble full of anthrax terrorized the East Coast and shut down Congress shortly after 9/11. Though denying it, U.S. intelligence indicates Saddam stockpiles thousands of liters of anthrax, botulinum toxin and other deadly germs and chemicals. Yet the U.N. insists that "no evidence" of biological and chemicals weapons exist, according to Hans Blix's latest inventory. Blix's March 7 progress report conveniently ignored Iraq's drone aircraft, specifically banned by prior U.N. resolutions and omitted from Iraq's official Dec. 12 declaration of all proscribed munitions. Saddam's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or drones can be equipped—like high-end crop-dusters—with high-pressure sprayers capable of spewing highly toxic biological and chemical agents.

      While the U.S. has its hands full in Iraq, it can't ignore the growing Iranian or North Korean nuclear threats. Picking the right battles, the White House must first neutralize Iraq before proceeding to Tehran or Pyongyang. "Here we suddenly discover that Iran is much further along, with a far more robust nuclear weapons programs than anyone said it had," said Powell, reminding the U.N. that the U.S. won't hand its national security over to the Security Council. Iran announced it would fire up its uranium enrichment plant near Isfahan, a popular spot in central Iran 400 kilometers from Kuwait, known for colorful Persian rugs. Monitoring events carefully in Iran, Israel raised concerns with the IAEA that Tehran already violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. After recently inspecting the Iranian facility, Elbaradei called for greater monitoring, concerned that Iran was producing fissile material.

      Since sacking the U.S. embassy and taking hostages in 1979, the U.S. hasn't had the warmest ties with Iran. Iran's hard-line Islamic government shows contempt not only for the U.S. but its young population, harboring tales of more progressive life under the Shah before the Ayatollahs took over. Unlike Iraq, Iran's nuclear program has been given a free ride, growing dangerously close to developing the next Islamic bomb. More than biological and chemical weapons, A-bombs give otherwise backward regimes diabolical leverage with which to blackmail—or dominate—legitimate countries. No U.N. resolution can stop irresponsible nuclear powers from exacting a heavy price. "Or it could indicate a willingness to use their nuclear weapons programs as a bargaining chip . . ." said Tamara Cofman Wittes, a Middle East expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, recently returning from Iran, concerned about possible nuclear blackmail.

      Placed in the context of nonproliferation, Iraq represents the next logical step to contain radical regimes from developing atomic weapons. Like Iraq, Iran would have little compunction about selling A-bombs to terrorist groups hell-bent on completing political aspirations though nuclear annihilation. Looking at the bigger picture, the U.N. must take inventory of how it already allowed North Korea and Iran to develop active nuclear programs. Inviting inspectors to power plants doesn't rule out clandestine uranium enrichment facilities busy generating fissile material for building nuclear bombs. "There are a number of ways by which the Iranians, if they chose to, could make our task in Iraq more difficult," said Wittes, noting that Iran fears U.S. encroachment on its nuclear weapons program. Whether the U.N. likes it or not, going to Iraq may be the only way to contain a more ominous Iranian threat.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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