by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright February 24, 2001
All Rights Reserved.

angerous lapses at the FBI compromise national security and raise disturbing questions about the fitness of key personnel in the U.S. intelligence community. Unable to make ends meet and playing out some twisted childhood fantasy, veteran FBI counterintelligence agent Robert Philip Hanssen discovered a creative way of supplementing his government salary. Playing double-agent, Hanssen found the Russians a good source of extra rubels, turning over 6,000 pages of classified documents and 26 computer disks, compromising the intelligence community and national security. In return for his effort, Hanssen earned $1.4 million in cash and diamonds, duping his department for 15 years. Now behind bars for espionage and treason, Hanssen’s arrest has many people scratching their heads. How could U.S. intelligence be so vulnerable to dangerous security lapses? Selling-out his country, Hanssen tiptoed beneath the radar screen giving the Russians insider-info on key U.S. intelligence personnel, FBI counterintelligence techniques, classified info on KGB operations, and scores of documents about double-agent programs. He turned over everything but the kitchen sink.

       Despite Hanssen’s security breach, FBI director Louis Freeh downplayed the obvious PR disaster, leaving the public without much confidence in the nation’s most coveted law enforcement agency. With the Wen Ho Lee debacle fresh still on the screen, the FBI didn’t need another PR nightmare. Talking tough, Freeh referred to Hansen’s conduct as “the most traitorous actions imaginable,” but conveniently found a silver lining, calling his arrest a “counterintelligence coup.” Some “coup” after Hanssen plundered U.S. security for over 15 years. Appearing pessimistic about the extent of damage to U.S. intelligence, “We believe, however, that it was exceptionally grave,” Freeh said, admitting that Hanssen’s actions severely compromise the FBI’s intelligence operations. While Freeh claims that Hansen’s arrest was based on “longstanding FBI-CIA efforts,” including extensive use of “substantial” covert surveillance, court-authorized searches, computer forensic analysis, and “other sensitive techniques,” less varnished reports indicate that Hanssen was simply betrayed by the KGB.

       Using code names and counterintelligence methods, Freeh claims that Hanssen eluded detection, slithering under FBI radar since 1985. According to an FBI affidavit, Hanssen began moonlighting back in 1985 when he sent a letter to the home of KGB officer Viktor M. Degtyar, informing him that he’d be delivering a box with “the most sensitive and highly compartmentalized projects of the U.S. intelligence community.” Operating as “B,” Hanssen told his new employer [the KGB] that, “All are originals to aid in verifying their authenticity . . . I believe they are sufficient to justify a payment of $100,000 payment to me.” Giving more details, “I have little need or utility for more than $100,000,” he wrote in one letter cited in the affidavit, “It merely provides a difficulty since I cannot spend it, store it or invest it easily . . . Perhaps some diamonds as security to my children.” Since 1985, Hanssen cleverly played mole, betraying his country for cash and diamonds. While the FBI advanced a mountain of evidence, Hanssen’s celebrity Washington defense attorney, Plato Cacheris called the government’s case “embryonic.”

       Though the slippery double-agent asked the KGB for “an escape plan” saying that “nothing lasts forever,” Hansen failed to detect the FBI’s 'gotcha' game when they transferred him from the State Department back to headquarters. Without seeing the sting, Hansen continued to make drops at identified locations, falling directly into Freeh’s trap. Like a deer caught in the headlights, it was Hanssen’s time to self-destruct—unable to escape the inevitable. “Individuals who commit treasonous acts against the United States will be held fully accountable . . .” warned newly minted Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft, pledging that the State Department will vigorously go after spies in the future. While hindsight’s always 20/20, the reality is that Hanssen gave away the store for 15 years. Taken together with concurrent infiltration of CIA double-agent Aldrich H. Ames, the U.S. intelligence community reads like an open book. Most covert operations—and the identities of key double-agents—are severely compromised endangering the lives of current counterintelligence personnel.

       While it’s difficult to generalize about the motives of all double-agents, press reports reveal a disturbed profile for Robert Philip Hanssen. Finding himself ignored and cut out of the loop in March 2000, Hanssen came unglued writing his Russian counterparts. “I have come about as close as I ever want to come to sacrificing myself to help you, and I get silence. I hate silence,” said Hanssen, clearly showing his weakness and trying desperately to reconnect with his old contacts. Like an actor groping for his next part, Hanssen’s self-worth deflated seeing himself as a has-been. Showing his mental imbalance, “One might propose that I am either insanely brave or quite insane. I’d answer neither. I’d say insanely loyal. Take your pick. There is insanity in all the answers,” Hanssen penned to his Russian friends, divulging that he had gone over the deep-end. Then, rambling on, Hanssen tipped his hand, “I have come close to the edge as I can without being truly insane,” revealing that his sick childhood obsession with Kim Philby, a British Intelligence officer turned double-agent, pushed him over the top.

       Going over the deep-end and acting out his obsession, Hanssen endangered the entire U.S. intelligence community and betrayed his country. While FBI director Louis Freeh would like to tout Hanssen’s arrest as a “counterintelligence coup,” it’s really a pathetic security lapse allowing garden variety mental cases to sabotage the entire system. Without regular psychological screenings, the law enforcement community has no way of determining fitness for duty. While it’s easy to blame Hanssen’s conduct as purely traitorous, it’s clear that this agent cracked long ago. Sure, Hanssen’s accountable for espionage and treason, but the FBI’s also responsible for ascertaining the psychological fitness for duty of its key agents and personnel. Like other rogue cops, agents must be mentally fit to perform the rigors of the job. There’s no excuse for loose cannons like Hanssen to slip between the cracks. Unpleasant as it sounds, routine screenings and regular supervisory evaluations would be good preventive medicine.

About the Author

John M. Curtis is editor of OnlineColumnist.com and columnist for the Los Angeles Daily Journal. He’s director of a Los Angeles think tank specializing in political consulting and strategic public relations. He’s the author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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