 |
 |
|||||
 |
||||||
|
||||||
 |
||||||
| Mission Impossible
by John M. Curtis Copyright February 10, 1998
Mired in the Lewinsky sex scandal, president Clinton is making his strongest case for bringing Saddam Hussein into compliance with Gulf War accords: unconditional access to suspected Iraqi weapons’ sites. No one can seriously argue that Saddam hasn’t impeded or even violated U.N. resolutions, but the case for military strikes against Iraq raises some inescapable questions. Generally, what are the airstrikes supposed to accomplish? Even secretary of defense William S. Cohen has cautioned against undue optimism about targeted airstrikes reducing or eliminating Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons’ capability. Realizing this, are limited airstrikes a means of forcing Saddam into compliance? Or, is flexing military muscle a vehicle to punish Saddam for failing to live up to his promises? Or, is a targeted bombing campaign a prelude to deposing the deranged despot? Or, more cynically, is the administration’s action an unmistakable diversionary tactic away from the president’s domestic troubles? Without seeming too paranoid, the public — and certainly the Congress — has a right to have some very specific answers. To date, the administration’s case has been tenuous at best. Why should anyone be surprised that stretching a national security argument to the breaking point hasn’t yet persuaded a sizable percentage of the American public? After all, how have America’s security interests been threatened at this time? Is the administration using the same tortured logic as the defense of the Menendez boys: namely, that they attacked and killed their parents out of a perceived threat or self-defense? Many diplomats are asking whether preemptive action involving military force — in the absence of a direct threat or violation of sovereignty — is justifiable? Judging by international response, most countries — especially Russia — find the U.S.’s logic difficult to follow. Surely, some standards for taking military action need to be in place. Are we to accept that any nation or group which perceives itself as threatened has a right to launch a military attack? Although these questions and others deserve answers, the right to use force isn’t really the most pressing issue: Once military action is decided, then what? What are the short, middle and long range goals? While the world awaits U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 11th-hour diplomatic mission, many view it as perfunctory and largely ceremonial. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, last ditch diplomacy was also attempted and failed. Obviously, at that time, with Iraq occupying Kuwait and with over 500,000 U.S. troops deployed to the region, the momentum for military action was unstoppable. That was then and this is now. With less than one tenth troop deployment, the present situation is far easier to stop at any point before the "quit or drop" order. Since rescuing a helpless ally and protecting the lifeblood of Western civilization isn’t at stake now, the mission of round-two in the Gulf remains obscured. While enforcing the U.N. resolutions is a worthy objective, Saddam Hussein clearly enjoys a distinct propaganda advantage: watching American public opinion emboldens Saddam’s defiance and affords certain public relations’ benefits. Clearly, the U.S. is seen as the aggressor in the world community. Although few like the Iraqi regime, many countries — like Russia and France — have ongoing economic ties. Any extended bombing campaign is bound to interfere with their trading relationships. Delivering, in effect, an ultimatum, U.N. Secretary Kofi Annan is likely to get an ear-full of the Iraqi position. Although to diplomatic personnel avoiding war seems like the highest priority, we should be reminded that war serves a useful function in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. Fighting and dying for your country — regardless of the continent — is the ultimate expression of loyalty. Treasonous voices, echoing sentiments like, "I’d rather have my country die for me. . .," are faced with summary executions. With Saddam’s "secret" police, pacifism is equated with treason and is met with erasure. Going inside Iraq’s psyche is nearly incomprehensible to Western democracies. Feeding his population a daily diet of propaganda, the Iraqi people always expect war with the United States or some other enemy. Maintaining their panic is essential to total control. And, like other hostages, they welcome verification of this perverted reality to which they’re endlessly exposed. As crazy as it seems, Iraq’s population welcomes a war as proof of their government’s authenticity. Without it, what’s the reality check? War serves as a convincing excuse for their widespread sacrifices and poverty. No. . .when Secretary General Kofi Annan faces Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz, he’s likely to face a continuation of the same brainwashing. Without it, Aziz wouldn’t be around to exchange diplomatic smoke. In Saddam’s world, he’s the victim. Delivering this ultimatum, many Western countries have to see Saddam Hussein as mad if he doesn’t finally acquiesce. But, in fact, inside the totalitarian mind, an attack by the U.S. or its allies is the very medicine which assures his grip on his people. Calls to set up radio-free Iraq or continue dropping CIA leaflets are about as convincing as trying to persuade Packer fans to embrace John Elway. Even with the machinery already beginning to turn and with the U.S. groping to clarify its objectives, it’s still not too late to escape mission impossible. About the Author John M. Curtis is director of a West Los Angeles think tank specializing in human behavior, health care and political research and media consultation. He’s a seminar trainer, columnist and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma. |
||||||
addam Hussein is a menace whose weapons of mass destruction threaten his neighbors and the world," said a mildly persuasive secretary of state Madeleine Albright to a crowded "town hall" meeting at Ohio State University. Taking president Clinton’s case of military action against Iraq to the public, administration officials attempted to convince a reluctant audience that Saddam Hussein’s regime poses a direct and provocative threat to world order. Faced with an annoying handful of hecklers, it’s proof that even the best planned publicity stunts can sometimes go awry. Commenting on the embarrassment and placing the best face on the event, administration officials were saying, "It’s like watching democracy in action . . . " Hardly. To more suspicious observers, the rush to military action seems to have a curious linkage to more ominous domestic political developments.|
Home || Articles || Books || The Teflon Report || Reactions || About Discobolos This site designed, developed and hosted by the experts at ©1999-2000 Discobolos Consulting Services, Inc. |
