Feith's Confession

by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright February 9, 2007
All Rights Reserved.

alling the Pentagon Inspector General's report “bizarre,” former director of the Office of Special Plans Douglas J. Feith, couldn't fathom the idea that his actions were “inappropriate” but not “unauthorized.” Feith's office was approved by former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to analyze intelligence in the wake of Sept. 11. After all, the Central Intelligence Agency under the direction of George J. Tenet dropped the ball, leading the White House and Pentagon to lose confidence with “civilian” intelligence-gathering. Acting Inspector General Thomas F. Gimble told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Feith took “inappropriate” actions advising the White House and Pentagon about a link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. There was no stronger excuse or justification for war with Iraq than connecting Saddam to the horrific events of Sept. 11.

      Gimble indicated that Feith's actions “were not illegal or unauthorized,” leading to the reasonable conclusion that White House and Pentagon officials sought to connect Saddam and Bin Laden. “I can't think of more devastating commentary,” said Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.), implying that Feith's office misled administration and Defense Department personnel. OSP indicated “multiple areas of cooperation” between Saddam and Al Qaeda, citing an alleged meeting between Sept. 11 ringleader Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague five months before 9/11. CIA officials could not corroborate the OSP's findings. “That was the argument that was used to make the sale to the American people about the need to go to war,” said Levin, viewing the IG's report as the “smoking gun,” proving the manipulation of prewar intelligence.

      Feith vigorously defended his actions, calling the OSP analysis simply a critique of existing intelligence. After Sept. 11, the White House was so shocked and disappointed by the CIA's failures, they ordered the Pentagon to take a more active role. What remains questionable is whether President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney ordered Feith to manufacture the intelligence needed to go to war against Saddam. At the same time the White House rejected the CIA, they also spurned the findings of Dr. Hans Blix and his team of U.N. weapons inspectors, who tried to assure the U.S. that Saddam no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction. At the same time Feith made his link between Saddam and Bin Laden, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell pitched the White House case at the U.N. Feb. 6, 2003 documenting Saddam's arsenal of WMD.

      While Feith operated his Pentagon operation, Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby was heavily involved in Aug. 02 with the White House Iraq Group. Bush senior advisor Karl Rove, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, her deputy Stephen Hadley, Bush chief of staff Andrew Card, Bush speechwriter Michael Gerson, Bush communication Director Karen Hughes, Cheney press aide Mary Matlin and others were told to sell the public on Saddam's arsenal of dangerous weapons. Condi used Gerson's image of a “mushroom cloud” to drive home the “unthinkable”—Saddam's A-bomb. As Feith pointed to Iraq's Al Qaeda connection, Libby & Co. exploited the press, especially, New York Times' Judith Miller and Time Magazine's Matthew Cooper, to write front-page stories hyping Saddam's alleged arsenal of nuclear and biologic weapons.

      Members of Congress that voted to authorize Bush to use force were subject to the same propaganda as the media and general public. In the year-long media blitz before Cruise Missiles hit Baghdad March 20, 2003, Fox News—and other conservative TV, radio and print outlets—paraded a bevy of former Iraqi exiles and bomb experts to tout Saddam's arsenal of WMD. In the dark shadow of Sept. 11, the mood of the country and Congress leaned toward caution, preemption and self-defense. Few in the media or Congress questioned the dubious sources of intelligence used by OSP or the clandestine White House Iraq Group. Much of the intelligence was supplied by former Iraqi exiles like Ahmed Chalibi with a vested interest in toppling Saddam. Feith and Libby bypassed the CIA and other credible intelligence sources and relied on bogus reports discredited by British and German Intelligence.

      Now under the gun, Feith says the OSP didn't manipulate intelligence, simply critiqued existing data, giving, as it were, a different point of view. “I'm trying to figure out why we are here, “ said Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.), taking the Inspector General's report with a grain of salt. In case Chambliss forgets, over 3,100 U.S. soldiers and $600 billion have been sacrificed in Iraq for a colossal miscalculation. It's curious why he and most of his GOP colleagues find nothing objectionable about the way in which the country was led to war. “The policy office has been smeared for years by allegations that its pre-Iraq-war work was somehow ‘unlawful' or ‘unauthorized,'" said Feith confessing that he had the blessings of the White House and Pentagon. Feith just dutifully did his job. No one at the White House or Pentagon was duped: They asked for it, and they got it.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.


Home || Articles || Books || The Teflon Report || Reactions || About Discobolos

This site designed, developed and hosted by the experts at

©1999-2005 Discobolos Consulting Services, Inc.
(310) 204-8300
All Rights Reserved.