by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright January 28, 2003
All Rights Reserved.

hen Columbia lifted off the launch pad at Cape Canaveral on Jan.16, its fate was sealed when a two hundred pound piece of foam insulation dislodged from the Saturn II rocket's external fuel tank, striking the shuttle's left wing, damaging heat-protective tiles. At the time of liftoff, NASA was well aware of the potential problem after reviewing videotape, but ruled the mishap inconsequential. "We spent a goodly amount reviewing that film and then analyzing what that potential impact of debris on the wing might do," said Ron Dittemore, NASA's manager of the space shuttle program. With serious damage to the orbiter's heat-shielding tiles, re-entry could cause catastrophic overheating, leading to eventual meltdown. With no way to fix the damage, Mission Control watched helplessly as Columbia disintegrated on re-entry. On board the ship, the crew no doubt knew that something went terribly wrong.

      Scouring the backcountry of Texas and Louisiana, teams of scavengers hope to find clues into what caused the latest NASA disaster. When the Challenger went down Jan. 28, 1986, an exhaustive investigation pointed to faulty "O-rings" in the solid rocket boosters, a weakness known—but ignored—for some time. Before Columbia launched, Mission Control also knew about mishaps with insulation and other debris striking the orbiter on takeoff. "We have a pretty good idea how big the size of the foam was," said Dittemore, acknowledging that the rocket's insulation hit the orbiter's wing. "What we don't understand [is] what the actual impact did to the tile." Judging by Columbia's disintegration at 200,000 feet, it suggests a catastrophic meltdown. Seven minutes before losing contact with Columbia, Mission Control noted failures with data sensors on the left wing and tire, the exact spot hit by falling debris .

      Despite debris hitting the orbiter on takeoff, NASA insisted that damage to the left wing was insignificant. "It was judged that the event did not represent a safety concern," said Dittemore, prompting engineers to not photograph the wing either from remote cameras or those fixed on the wing. Once liftoff occurs, there's no turning back. External fuel tanks don't dislodge until the shuttle reaches its orbiting altitude of 170 miles. With serious damage to heat-insulating tiles, the shuttle was doomed from liftoff. Whether Mission Control knew the extent of the damage is anyone's guess. But had they known, there's nothing they could have done to save the shuttle. Columbia was not equipped with the portable docking equipment needed attach to the orbiting space station. Even with that capability, Columbia lacked the propellant needed to reach the space station orbiting at 240 miles.

      Poignant memorial services won't correct ongoing safety concerns resulting in tragic mishaps. On liftoff in 2000, foam insulation split off from Endeavor's external fuel tank attached to the Saturn II rocket. While engineers noted only "superficial damage," they still acknowledged injury to heat-protective tiles on the skirt of one of the booster rockets. Luckily for Endeavor, the heat tiles weren't in a critical part of the wing absorbing blistering re-entry temperatures exceeding 3000 degrees. While the salvage operation looks for damaged heat tiles, NASA management should take a bruising inventory of how they ignored the insulation problem. "The attitude is that 'we'll get around to it some time' and that's just what happened with Challenger," said Albert O. Wheelon, who served on the commission that investigated the Challenger disaster. No concern should be regarded as "superficial" when it comes to human survival.

      Blaming Columbia's tragedy on NASA's lowered budgets doesn't answer how design flaws in the insulation around the orbiter's external fuel tank damaged heat protective tiles. With the re-entry angle very precise, one-degree plus or minus creates catastrophic problems, including severe overheating when Columbia descended to 85 miles, traveling 16,700 mph. Columbia eventually disintegrated at around 40 miles, traveling12,500 mph, scattering wreckage over parts of California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and Louisiana. Like the Challenger, what brought Columbia down was failure to solve a well-known problem dismissed as "superficial." "You can only improve on a 40-year-old design so much," said Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Huntington Beach), a member of the House subcommittee on space and aeronautics. "We may find that the odds have just been against us because we're operating with old technology."

      Human error—not built-in obsolescence—brought Columbia crashing down. Once the shuttle lifted off on Jan. 16, the flight was doomed. Neither Mission Control nor the seven gifted astronauts could repair heat-protective tiles severely damaged by falling debris at liftoff. Without contingency plans, there was no escape from a shuttle with severely damaged tiles. Had Mission Control known the extent of the damage, they could only wait and watch the crew either suffocate in orbit or immolate on re-entry. However unlikely, future shuttles should be redesigned for potential rescue operations, including technology for retrieving astronauts from disabled ships. Nothing is more precious than the human cargo of courageous men and women exploring space for the betterment of humankind. At the very least, NASA must go back to the drawing board, take a searching inventory and reassess its current priorities.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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