Iraq's Rebirth

by John M. Curtis
(310) 204-8700

Copyright January 16, 2004
All Rights Reserved.

hen Saddam was beaten back from Kuwait in 1991 in the first Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush made a fateful decision: Leave a crippled Saddam in power or face an almost certain power vacuum with his removal. Despite his brutality, Saddam held an iron grip on the Shiite population, threatening, along with the Ayatollahs in Iran, another Islamic revolution that eventually toppled the Shah in 1979. With all its problems, Saddam's Iraq was a secular dictatorship, still more amenable to Western ways than the backward theocracy that replaced the Shah. Thirteen years later, with Saddam out of the picture, the same scenario presents a direct and provocative threat to U.S. interests in Iraq. With the White House planning to transfer back Iraq's sovereignty in June, “W” faces an unsavory paradox: Democratization might actually threaten U.S. interests and national security.

      On Nov. 15, the U.S. entered an agreement with its handpicked Iraqi Governing Council to turn over sovereignty in June. Current plans, led by U.S. civilian administrator, L. Paul Bremer III, call for Iraq to pick representatives, reflecting various ethnic groups, for a new assembly that will form the core of a transitional government. Bremer's plan indefinitely delays free elections, concerned that Iraq's Shiite majority would legitimately ascend to power, triggering civil war with rival Sunnis. Iraq's leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani strongly opposes the current plan, sending tens-of-thousands of protestors into the streets of Basra in southern Iraq. Bremer walks a dangerous tightrope trying to preserve order and satisfy U.S. interests while, at the same time, letting the Iraqi people chose their own form of government. Without free elections, no government can truly claim legitimacy.

      Sistani presents problems for the White House, Bremer and the current Governing Council. U.S. officials believe that hasty elections would hand power the Shiites, wreaking havoc on Iraq's ethnic minorities, especially Sunnis once loyal to Saddam Hussein. Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terror organization practice Wahabbism, Sunni Islam's most radical and violent sect. Saddam went to war in 1980 against Iran's Supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini, once threatening to conquer Iraq and return the glory of ancient Persia. Bush already promised that Saddam's Baathists, comprised largely of Sunnis, would not return to power. Since Iraq is over 60% Shiites, Sistani packs considerable influence. “We are neither so stupid nor so reckless as to want to make an enemy of Sistani,” said a senior U.S. official, acquiescing to dangerous riptides buffeting U.S. policy.

      After spending untold billions and sacrificing over 500 U.S. lives, the U.S. can't get intimidated or blackmailed by any political group—no matter how powerful. There's far too much at stake liberating Iraq from one secular dictator to find it enslaved by religious zealots committed to creating the next Islamic state. If Sistani gets his way, Iraq will follow Iran into a cruel religious abyss, far worse than Saddam's secular dictatorship. A Shiite theocracy in Iraq would galvanize radical Islam and give far more clout to Iran while they pursue more weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Though modifying the Nov. 15 agreement will be met with resistance, the U.S. can't cow to Sistani's pressure seeking, at the earliest time, sovereignty for a new Shiite regime. Calling for general elections too soon would almost guarantee turning Iraq into the world's next Islamic state.

      So far, the official U.S. position is that there's not enough time to conduct free elections before June. In reality, there's too much time to let “democracy” destroy the U.S. mission in Iraq. More than finding dangerous weapons, Iraq provides the U.S. an important strategic base from which to neutralize Iran and Syria as they sponsor terrorism and pursue weapons of mass destruction. Turning Iraq over to Sistani would sabotage U.S. efforts to bring stability to the Middle East. Even current Iraqi Governing Council President Adnan Pachachi recognizes the danger of hastily called elections. He, along with other Sunnis, prefers the caucus process by which delegates are selected for a new governing assembly. “How does one give enough to the Shia majority, and not have that be too much for the Kurds or Sunnis?” said Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, pinpointing the current dilemma.

      No Iraqi cleric or politician should be calling the shots about how the White House must craft a new government favorable to U.S. interests. Bush's goal of “transforming the Middle East” won't take place by handing sovereignty over religious fanatics hell-bent on creating the next Islamic state. “It's less a problem of our staying power and more a question of how long the welcome mat will be out,” said Haass failing to admit that the U.S. military aren't invited guests. After sacrificing billions and American lives, it's no time to get weak-kneed and cow to outside pressure. Sistani must be reminded that clerics don't craft or run civilian governments—including the one considered in Iraq. No timetable or outside pressure should distract the U.S. from completing its mission of improving national security. With elections just around the corner, the White House better get it right.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of OnlineColumnist.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.


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